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Rethinking Criminal Contempt tn 
the Bankruptcy Courts 
INTRODUCTION 
by 
John A. E. Pottow* 
& 
Jason S. Levin** 
Judicial actors in bankruptcy have been around for well longer than the 
National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, but it is safe to say that there has 
been a long, steady march toward increased respectability of these curious 
legal beasts. Many have ruminated about their unique and sometimes contro-
versial role in the modern judicial system,! and the Supreme Court's recent 
jurisprudence has brought a renewed focus on the role of bankruptcy judges 
within the federal judiciary. On the constitutional level, the Court's Stern 
trilogy has dragged into the fore the uncertain and contested nature of bank-
ruptcy judge authority to exercise the judicial power of the United States 
under Article liP And on the statutory level, indirectly invoking concerns 
of adjudicative legitimacy, the Court has offered similar comments on the 
scope of a bankruptcy judge's inherent equitable authority in the Law v. 
Siegel case.3 There is an inescapable subtext to these cases (although perhaps 
walked back a bit in Wellness Int'l N..etwor~, Ltd. v. Sharif): bankruptcy 
judges are not fully "real" judges, and so they have to be watched with suspi-
cion lest they unravel our constitutional principles as we know them.4 This 
has some wondering whether the march toward greater respectability and 
acceptance has marched right off a cliff, triggering a backlash on these judicial 
*John Philip Dawson Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
**J.D. Candidate, 2017, University of Michigan Law School. We are grateful to Professor Laura 
Bartell for comments. 
1See, e.g., G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Bankruptcy and the Problems of Economic Futility: A Theory on the 
Unique Role of Bankruptcy Law, 55 Bus. LAw. 499, 499 n.1 (2000) (collecting scholarly views). 
2See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015); Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. 
Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011). 
3 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014). 
4"The next time Congress takes judicial power from Article III courts, the encroachment may not be 
so modest-and we will no longer hold the high ground of principle. The majority's acquiescence in the 
erosion of our constitutional power sets a precedent that I fear we will regret." Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 
1950 (Roberts, C.]., dissenting). 
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upstarts, with the Supreme Court opinions leading the way.5 
It is of course too early to tell whether we are in a new era of bankruptcy 
judge (dis)respectability. Only time will tell. But this Article performs a 
specific case study, on one discrete area of bankruptcy court authority, based 
upon a particular assumption in that regard. The assumption is this: certain 
high-salience judicial events-here, the recent Supreme Court bankruptcy 
judge decisions, coupled with earlier constitutional precedents involving the 
limits of Article III-can trigger overreaction and hysteria. Lower courts 
may read these Supreme Court decisions as calling into question the permissi-
bility of certain bankruptcy court practices under the Constitution, and justi-
fying a wholesale scale-back of all bankruptcy court power. One need go no 
further than Stern v. Marshall, which induced such shock waves it required 
the Court to revisit the matter twice in barely as many years while the ink 
was still drying.6 And Law, close on Stern's heels, made some comments in 
dictum casting at least some doubt on the strength of the Court's support for 
bankruptcy judges exercising inherent equitable power, sending off further 
ripples of anxiety.7 
This backlash motivated us to reconsider one especially thorny area of 
bankruptcy court authority, namely, the propriety of issuing criminal con-
tempt citations. 8 While the issue has been brewing in the federal courts for 
years, the Supreme Court's recent skepticism over the authority of bank-
ruptcy courts makes renewed analysis of the debate timely. Perhaps per-
versely, we want to go in the opposite direction from where our assumption 
of a hysteria bubble might lead. That is, post Stern and Law, we might ex-
pect many lower courts to be even more anxious about the power of bank-
ruptcy courts to award such sanctions, i.e., that these judges should learn to 
stay in their place and not overstep their authority, which has once again 
5See Randolph]. Haines, The Conservative Assault on Federal Equity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.]. 451 (2014). 
6Stern, 564 U.S. 462 (2011); see also In re Ambac Financial Grp., Inc., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that "Stern v. Marshall has become the mantra of every litigant who, for strategic 
or tactical reasons, would rather litigate somewhere other than the bankruptcy court"), affd, No. 10-B-
15973 SCC, 2011 WL 6844533 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2011), affd, 487 F. App'x 663 (2d Cir. 2012); Tyson 
A. Crist, Stern v. Marshall: Application of the Supreme Court's Landmar~ Decision in the Lower Courts, 86 
AM. BANKR. L.]. 627 (2012) (detailing the "upheaval" caused by Stern). 
7Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188, 1194-95 (2014) (Scalia,].). 
8 Robert ]. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal 
Contempt, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 677 (1981) ("Few legal concepts have bedeviled courts, judges, lawyers and 
legal commentators more than contempt of court."). It is now widely accepted that bankruptcy judges 
possess the authority to impose civil contempt. See, e.g., In re Downs, 103 F.3d 472, 477 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(highlighting that a bankruptcy judge possesses the same authority to impose civil sanctions as a district 
court judge); In re Skinner, 917 F.2d 444, 450 (lOth Cir. 1990) (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982)) ("[T]he delegation of civil contempt power to bankruptcy 
courts does not 'impermissibly remove[] ... [sic] 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from the 
Article III district courts .... "). 
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attracted the watchful eye of the Court.9 But we decided to go another 
way-why not go back to first principles and, instead of having to defend the 
propriety of bankruptcy courts issuing criminal contempt orders, ask whether 
there is anything wrong with bankruptcy judges so doing, i.e., to start with a 
presumption that such relief is j"ust fine until convinced otherwise. 
As we dug through the case law, it will surprise few readers to learn that 
there were firmly established circuit precedents prohibiting bankruptcy 
courts from imposing criminal contempt sanctions in no uncertain terms. 10 
But the more we went through the cases, especially against the backdrop of 
historical practice in the bankruptcy courts and their predecessors, the more 
we became convinced that these opinions were flawed-the result of over-
readings of Supreme Court precedents and unfounded policy concerns. They 
lacked solid constitutional foundation. In other words, to invoke once again 
our intentionally provocative image, these decisions appeared to be based 
upon, and aimed to increase, bankruptcy hysteria. 
This Article concludes that there is nothing intrinsically problematic 
from a constitutional, statutory, or policy perspective with bankruptcy 
courts issuing criminal contempt orders. To reach this conclusion requires 
more than a few steps. This Article begins with a lay of the land, assaying 
current judicial treatment of bankruptcy courts' contempt power. It then ex-
amines the historical context of bankruptcy judges, paying particular atten-
tion to the sui generis role bankruptcy courts have played in the judiciary's 
evolution. Next, it considers the various statutory concerns in light of the 
complex legislative innovations regarding bankruptcy courts in the United 
States. After that, the Article considers constitutional jurisprudence regard-
ing Article III and other provisions. Finally, the Article discusses pertinent 
collateral policy concerns that we deem to have played a significant role in 
the evolution of criminal contempt powers in the bankruptcy courts. 
I. THE LAY OF THE LAND 
A. CIRCUIT CouRT DISAGREEMENT AND CoNFusiON 
The question whether bankruptcy judges possess criminal contempt 
power is an unsettled and divisive question among the lower courts. A semi-
This notion of a pumped-up § 105 was relatively short-lived and rebuked by the 
Supreme Court in a unanimous decision decided last term[, Law v. Siegel] . . . 
While it is often tempting to override the mandate of a statutory requirement in 
circumstances where, like here, the Code does not seem logical or application of the 
Code section will yield a harsh result, § 105(a) is not a panacea to correct judge· 
perceived legislative mistakes. 
In re Martinez, 515 B.R. 383, 385-86 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2014). 
10See, e.g., In re Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2003); In re Hipp, Inc., 895 F.2d 1503, 1510 
(5th Cir. 1990). 
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nal case denying such a power is the Fifth Circuit's opinion in In re Hipp. 11 
Although it used the constitutional avoidance doctrine to interpret 18 U.S.C. 
§ 401 and 11 U.S.C. § 105, the court's analysis was unquestionably driven 
by Article III of the Constitution: "The principal constitutional concern here 
arises from the fact that bankruptcy judges do not have life tenure during 
good behavior and protection against diminished compensation which Article 
III, section 1, requires for federal judges exercising 'the judicial power of the 
United States."' 12 In light of these constitutional concerns, the Fifth Circuit 
held that § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, which empowers a bankruptcy 
court to issue any ""order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropri-
ate to carry out the provisions of this title[,]"l 3 could not be read to include 
criminal contempt powers. 14 The court cited the N..orthern Pipeline Con-
struction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. plurality decision, 15 and then ana-
lyzed the provisions of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code struck down by that 
decision, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the jurisprudence per-
taining to magistrate judge contempt authority. 16 (The Fifth Circuit did con-
cede § 105 could authorize civil contempt ordersP) 
The Eight Circuit's opinion in In re Ragar, which responded to a lawyer's 
appeal for criminal contempt fines levied against him by the bankruptcy 
court, came to the nearly opposite result.18 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court embraced a generous reading of§ 105, noting ""[t]he plain meaning of 
the statute authorizes at least as much as [the criminal contempt order] 
here." 19 Ragar did not directly contradict Hipp, however, because the bank-
ruptcy court there had entered only a presumptive finding of criminal con-
tempt; the contemnor was entitled to de novo reconsideration in district 
court (although in another Eighth Circuit case a direct order was upheld).20 
The Eighth Circuit made clear it disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's belief that 
"895 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1990). 
12Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1510. 
1311 U.S.C. § 105(a). 
14While nominally adhering to the avoidance doctrine, the court revealed its constitutional conclusion 
in a footnote wherein it expressed that it just thought the practice was unconstitutional. See Hipp, 895 
F.2d at 1511 n.16 (denying that bankruptcy courts have an inherent criminal contempt authority). 
15458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
16895 F.2d at 1506-21. The Court also noted that the Sixth Amendment would confer a right to a 
jury trial for sentences of incarceration more than six months. I d. at 1509 (citing Frank v. United States, 
395 U.S. 147 (1969)). 
17Id. at 1517. 
183 F.3d 1174, 1177-80 (8th Cir. 1993). 
19Id. at 1178; see Jove Eng'g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d 1539, 1554 (11th Cir. 1996). Courts' contradictory 
perceptions of§ 105's purportedly clear text is sometimes dispiriting. Cf In re Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, 
Inc., 108 F.3d 609, 613 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that the plain language of§ 105 is ~unambiguous" in its 
grant of solely civil contempt power and not criminal contempt). 
20Ragar, 3 F.3d at 1177-78; see Isaacson v. Manty, 721 F.3d 533, 538-39 (8th Cir. 2013). 
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§ 105 could not house the power to order a finding of criminal contempt in 
no uncertain terms: "With all respect, we think this is simply wrong."21 The 
Court expanded, ""An order of criminal contempt, no less than one of civil 
contempt, is necessary or appropriate to enforce the order whose violation it 
is imposed, and the statute in pursuance of which that order was itself 
entered."22 
Other courts have their own approaches. For example, the Ninth Circuit 
also believes there is constitutional infirmity with bankruptcy judges impos-
ing sanctions based on criminal contempt, but its belief is founded on due 
process.23 While the Ninth Circuit, too, purported to.be merely interpreting 
§ 105 not to authorize "serious non-compensatory fines" through the avoid-
ance doctrine, its holding was equally driven by constitutional angst, albeit 
directed at due process: "Our interpretation of the language of § 105(a) is 
reinforced by the fundamental due process considerations we discussed in 
Hanshaw."24 Thus, in the Ninth Circuit, apparently some criminal contempt 
is acceptable-"relatively mild" fines- but not too much.25 In fact, the 
Ninth Circuit has gone back and forth on bankruptcy judge limits, initially 
finding bankruptcy judges cannot even enter orders of civil contempt,26 but 
then backtracking to recast the prohibition as principally on criminal con-
tempt.27 The Sixth Circuit, too, follows this hybrid approach of allowing 
"some" criminal contempt.28 The Seventh Circuit appears not to want to 
touch the issue with a ten-foot pole.29 Thus, while it is clear that most 
courts have problems with bankruptcy judges entering judgments of criminal 
contempt, for many the reasoning is not always consistent. Indeed, the ratio-
nale tends to bounce around from constitutional to statutory, and even policy 
grounds.3° Certainly the matter has never gotten to the Supreme Court. 
21 Ragar, 3 F.3d at 1179. 
22Id. The Eighth Circuit appears to have implicitly acknowledged the authority of bankruptcy courts 
to issue criminal contempt orders (not just a presumptive finding subject to de novo review), although in 
doing so it did not directly address Article III issues. Isaacson v. Manty, 721 F.3d at 538-39 (8th Cir. 
2013). 
23See Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing FJ. Hanshaw Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River 
Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1137-38 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
24Id. at 1194-95 (noting that bankruptcy courts are "ill-equipped" to protect the due process rights, 
such as the right to a jury trial; also noting "fundamental constitutional questions" under Article Ill); 
accord In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 552 F. App'x 401, 415-16 (6th Cir. 2013). 
25Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1193; see also Hanshaw, 244 F.3d at 1140 n.lO (declining to determine "the precise 
limit for a 'serious' sanction entitling an individual to a jury trial"). 
26ln re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd., Inc., 827 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute, Pub. L. 
95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), as recognized in In re Rainbow Maga;:ine, Inc., 77 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1996). 
27In re Rainbow Magazine, Inc., 77 F.3d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1996). 
28John Richards Homes Bldg., 552 F. App'x at 415-16. 
29Cox v. Zale Delaware, Inc., 239 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the court could "save the 
issue of the bankruptcy judges' criminal-contempt powers for another day"). 
30See, e.g., John Richards Homes Bldg., 552 F. App'x 401; Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178; Ragar, 3 F.3d 1174, 
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Accordingly, we proceed in this Article to unpack, and then critique, the 
reasons advanced for objecting to bankruptcy court criminal contempt power. 
B. PRELIMINARY MATTERS OF LEXICOLOGY AND TAXONOMY 
Leaving aside for the moment the added complications when judges who 
lack full Article III protections get involved, the law surrounding criminal 
contempt is already, putting matters charitably, "uncertain." In the common 
sentiment of one court, "A proceeding to punish for contempt is sui 
generis."31 Contempt goes back centuries through the common law, and the 
ability-some would say the inalienable right-of judges to issue orders of 
contempt has never been defined with anything approaching clarity.32 None-
theless, there are some baseline distinctions that are generally agreed to, even 
if the debate over their legal significance persists. The reader should be famil-
iarized with three specific distinctions before proceeding further. 
First, there is a difference between a court's inherent authority to police 
conduct within its jurisdiction and the authority to issue contempt orders. 
Although there is large overlap between these two concepts, and, indeed, the 
basis of the power to issue a contempt order may well stem from a court's 
inherent authority, jurisprudence has treated these two as analytically dis-
tinct. The distinction has to do with the need and consequence of statutory 
authorization. Consider, for example, the specific grant of statutory authority 
to magistrate judges to issue contempt awards. 33 One could take the position 
that absent such a grant, magistrate judges would be impotent to issue any 
order of contempt and would instead rely on district court judges to mete out 
any contempt-like remedy deemed necessary under the circumstances. Under 
this approach, unless and until Congress acts, there is no power of contempt. 
Indeed, there is a federal criminal contempt statute for the district (and cir-
cuit) courts, 18 U.S.C. § 401, which confers/codifies the power to issue cer-
tain contempt orders: 
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by 
fine or imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such con-
tempt of its authority, and none other, as-
1177 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that questions concerning bankruptcy court criminal contempt power "have 
divided the Circuits"); In re Hipp, 895 F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1990). 
Hin re Paleais, 296 F. 403, 406 (2d Cir. 1924). A divided Michigan Supreme Court recently struggled 
with whether civil contempt should be considered a tort. See In re Bradley Estate, 835 N.W.2d 545 
(Mich. 2013). 
32See, e.g., John Richards Homes Bldg., 552 F. App'x 401; Dyer, 322 F.3d 1178; Ragar, 3 F.3d 1174; 
Hipp, 895 F.2d 1503. 
33See Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the restriction against magis· 
trate judges' imposition of criminal contempt is "not unwise"). 
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( 1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near 
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; 
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official 
transactions; 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, or-
der, rule, decree, or command.34 
By contrast, to the extent that a court possesses "inherent authority," it 
would presumably be self-executing, not beholden to Congress to pass ena-
bling legislation. And perhaps more controversially, it would be beyond Con-
gress's authority to purport to restrict such authority without wandering 
into separation of powers concerns. Moreover, as a threshold matter to the 
possession of "inherent authority," there might be a definitional question: is 
the tribunal a "court" in the first place?35 Finally, there might even be a 
taxonomy question: even if the tribunal is a court, is there a hierarchy of 
courts, where some possess inherent authority and some do not, or where 
some possess more inherent authority than others? None of these questions 
has been definitely resolved by the Supreme Court, but the relevant point for 
present discussion is that there is a core "inherent" power of courts to police 
conduct that likely requires no statutory authorization. 
Second, within the specific domain of contempt, there has developed a 
division between direct and indirect contempt.36 Direct contempt is con-
tempt committed in the presence of the court, such as disrupting the judicial 
proceedings.37 Indirect contempt occurs outside the courtroom, such as 
threatening a judge or otherwise impugning the court itself, albeit not in the 
judge's immediate presence.38 The distinction matters because some believe 
it is the relevant threshold for delineating the scope of a court's inherent 
authority and may circumscribe a sphere within which Congress cannot cur-
34 18 U.S.C. § 401; see also In re Bradley, 588 F.3d 254,265 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that "[w]hile 
the criminal contempt power is limited by 18 U.S.C. [§] 401, civil contempt remains a creature of inherent 
power"). The federal criminal contempt statute is implemented through FED. R. CRIM. P. 42, which adds 
restrictions on its use. 
35Cf Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 888-89 (1991) (finding that, at least for purposes of the 
Appointments Clause, the Article I Tax Court fits Article II's definition of a "Court of Law," and thus as 
a non-Article III tribunal exercises the "judicial power of the United States"). 
3,s..Before the 19th century was out, a distinction had been carefully drawn between contempts occur-
ring within the view of the court, for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence were dispensed 
with, and all other contempts where more normal adversary procedures were required." Bloom v. Illinois, 
391 U.S. 194, 204 (1968) (citing In re Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) and Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267 
(1889)); see also Ronald]. Rychlak, Direct Criminal Contempt and the 'Trial Attorney: Constitutional 
Limitations on the Contempt Power, 14 AM.]. TRIAL Aovoc. 243 (1990) (discussing the evolution of 
contempt). 
37United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d 372, 373 (9th Cir. 1971). 
38Jd. 
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tail the contempt power.39 It may also reflect (although this, too, is far from 
clear in the constitutional jurisprudence) an area in which the Due Process 
Clause and related procedural provisions accord contextually fewer rights to 
a putative contemnor.4° This distinction has been recogniz;ed in the modern 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which accord judges the power to punish direct 
contempt summarily in the absence of independent prosecution: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of these rules, the 
court (other than a magistrate judge) may summarily punish 
a person who commits criminal contempt in its presence if 
the judge saw or heard the contemptuous conduct and so 
certifies; a magistrate judge may summarily punish a person 
as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 636(e). The contempt order 
must recite the facts, be signed by the judge, and be filed 
with the clerk.4 1 
Finally, there is a distinction between civil and criminal contempt. The 
canonical articulation of the divide is that civil contempt is used to enforce 
compliance with a court order, and thus the punishment, be it fine or confine-
ment, has to be defeasible upon compliance. The contemnor is said to "carry 
the keys of their prison in their own pocket."42 The associated fines are 
typically payable to the aggrieved party.43 Criminal contempt involves, as its 
name implies, a transgression against the State (here, technically, its court) 
and can warrant non-compensatory punishment, either fines or imprison-
ment.44 Because criminal contempt triggers criminal procedural rights, the 
contemnor is entitled to due process.45 This distinction holds even though 
there is considerable overlap between the content and justification of many 
civil and criminal contempt orders. Consider, by contrast, that punitive dam-
ages in tort law-whose express purpose is to punish-trigger no general 
rights to counsel and other accoutrements of criminal due process, only loose 
constitutional oversight of the proportionality of the award under the Eighth 
Amendment.46 Unsurprisingly, congressional statutes and judicial rules more 
closely police criminal contempt awards.47 
39See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 839-44 (1994) (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
40Id. at 838 (Blackmun, ].). 
41FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b). Congress has also seized upon the indirect/direct division in according 
magistrate judges greater authority to enter final judgments for direct contempt. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) 
(allowing final entry of judgment if penalty is under $5,000 or imprisonment of thirty days). 
42Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911) (quoting In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 
461 (8th Cir. 1902)); accord Penfield Co. of Cal. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947). 
43Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441. 
44Jd. 
45Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826 (1994). 
46See BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,574-75 (1996). 
47See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) (prescribing restrictions on criminal contempt proceedings, such as 
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While there are many other distinctions of relevance, e.g., whether im-
prisonment or merely payment of money is ordered, these three divisions 
seem the ones most in need of scrutiny. For example, whether some relief 
falls within the inherent authority of a court implicates separation of powers, 
as perhaps does whether it is direct or indirect contempt; whether a con-
tempt order is deemed "criminal" implicates the Due Process Clause and asso-
ciated constitutional protections. But what's especially relevant for purposes 
of this Article is these divisions unquestionably do work, whether or not 
stemming from a constitutional compulsion, in the case law. In sum, these 
divisions in the contempt terrain, whether coterminous with constitutional 
boundaries or not, are well established and guiding, perhaps subconsciously, 
legislative and judicial analysis of the contempt power. 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
A. EARLY ENGLISH BANKRUPTCY CoMMISSIONERS 
As is well known, the English judicial system constructed a division still 
relevant in today's modern judicial system-the distinction between "com-
mon law" or "law" courts and "chancery" or "equity" courts.48 These two 
systems, while complementary, maintained different juridical processes. The 
law courts revolved around three defining procedures: "the writ ... , the jury, 
and single issue pleading."49 Such proceedings contained formalized mecha-
nisms designed to ensure litigants a predictable application of the law. Courts 
of equity, by contrast, were designed to offer flexibility and to "provide com-
prehensive determinations which could not be obtained through the common 
law courts."50 But the dichotomy was both porous and incomplete. For ex-
ample, the early Ecclesiastical courts maintained power over matters such as 
"family law, divorce, and probate proceedings."51 
Situated somewhat uniquely within this system were early English bank-
ruptcy commissioners, who wielded considerable authority. The source of 
this expansive and unique power was codified in the English bankruptcy acts 
of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries,52 which were "centered around the 
inability of trial court to prosecute absent an independent prosecutor and mandatory recusal if the alleged 
contumacious conduct involved insult of the presiding judge). 
48See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 914 (1987). 
49Id. 
50See Marcia S. Krieger, "The Ban~ruptcy Court Is a Court of Equity": What Does That Mean?, 50 
S.C. L. REv. 275, 278 (1999) (citation omitted). 
51
] ames E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 
118 HARV. L. REv. 643, 716 n.323 (2004). 
52 13 Eliz. c. 7 (1570) (Eng.); 1 Jac. c. 15 (1604) (Eng.); 21 Jac. c. 19 (1623) (Eng.); 5 Geo. 2, c. 30 (1732) 
(Eng.); 5 Geo. 4, c. 98, § 1 (1824) (Eng.). In 1571, the Elizabethan statute bestowed upon the Lord 
Chancellor exclusive bankruptcy jurisdiction to "appoint commissioners under the great seal." John C. 
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construct of a bankrupt's 'estate."'53 Bankruptcy cases began when the Lord 
Chancellor would issue a ~commission of Bankrupt," naming five commission-
ers, all of whom were lawyers, to carry out the case. 54 The five commission-
ers, or quorum of three, were tasked with oversight of the estate and case,55 
determining the status of the bankrupt,56 distributing the bankrupt's assets, 
and discharging the bankrupt's debts.57 Once assigned the case, the commis-
sioners had to meet with the bankrupt's creditors a minimum of three times 
(presaging our modern § 341 hearings).58 This was a necessary step in the 
process of examining the bankrupt and having the individual deliver his prop-
erty to the commissioners or assignees for adjudication of the estate.59 The 
commissioners' power, while considerable, was difficult to classify: 
It was the commissioners who took the bankrupt's property, 
assigned it, and distributed the proceeds to creditors who 
had proved their claims. This power was said to combine 
legal and equitable jurisdiction. Necessarily making determi-
nations of law and fact as they carried out these duties, the 
commissioners clearly functioned in a judicial fashion, and 
colloquially, at least, they could be labeled a court.60 
The commissioners notably possessed significant enforcement power. For 
example, under one early statute commissioners were permitted literally to 
seiz.e a recalcitrant bankrupt.61 They could issue written or oral interrogato-
ries to examine the debtor and others summoned to creditor meetings.62 Ad-
ditionally, commissioners could penetrate all aspects of the bankrupt's 
property, including houses, warehouses, trunks, and chests.63 They could 
thus seiz.e all property the debtor possessed, either actually or construe-
McCoid, II, Right to Jury 'Trial in Ban~ruptcy: Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 65 AM. BANKR. L.]. 15, 
29 (1991). The English bankruptcy acts were revised in 1824. See An Act to Consolidate and Amend 
the Bankruptcy Law, 5 Geo. 4, ch. 98, § 1 (1824) (Eng.); accord Thomas E. Plank, Why Ban~ruptcy Judges 
Need Not and Should Not Be Article III Judges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567, 575-76 n.55 (1998). 
53 Ralph Brubaker, A "Summary" Statutory and Constitutional 'Theory of Ban~ruptcy Judges' Core Juris-
diction After Stem v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.]. 121, 123 (2012). 
54 13 Eli~:. c. 7, § 2 (1570) (Eng.); accord Plank, supra note 52, at 567 n.57. 
55 See id. at 576. 
56It was necessary to satisfy two jurisdictional requirements during this time: the bankrupt in question 
was a "merchant who had committed an act of bankruptcy." Id. at 581. 
57/d. at 576. 
585 Geo. 2, c. 30, §§ 1, 2 (1732) (Eng.); accord 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *478-87; 
see generally 11 U.S.C. § 341 (required statutory meeting for debtor examination by creditors). 
59Plank, supra note 52, at 576. The commissioners had the power to appoint temporary assignees to 
hold all of the bankrupt's property. 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, §§ 30 (1732) (Eng.). 
60McCoid, supra note 52, at 29-30. 
61 1 Jac. c. 15, § 6 (1604) (Eng.). 
625 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 16 (1732) (Eng.). 
6321 Jam., ch. 19, § 8 (1623) (Eng.); accord Plank, supra note 52, at 585-87. 
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tively.64 The commissioners even were permitted to imprison non-debtor 
individuals for failure to answer questions satisfactorily,65 and they could 
make judges of the courts of record or the justices of the peace issue warrants 
for the imprisonment of any debtor "proved before them to become bank-
rupt."66 These powers, it seems fair to say, granted commissioners substan-
tial authority in presiding over their bankruptcy proceedings that "touch[ ed] 
all Matters relating to the Person, Trade, Dealings, Estate and Effects" of the 
alleged bankrupt.67 
Interestingly, the commissioners' authority did not go unquestioned. 
While bankruptcy participants maintained the ability to challenge the find-
645 Ceo. 2, c. 30, § 14 (1732) (Eng.). 
65 5 Ceo. 2, c. 30, § 16 (1732) (Eng.). Individuals imprisoned by the commissioners could seek release 
by writ of habeas corpus. See Plank, supra note 52, at 578-79 n.74. Part of§ 16 of the 1732 Act read: 
[I]n case any such bankrupt or bankrupts, or other person or persons, shall refuse to 
answer, or shall not fully answer to the satisfaction of the commissioners, or the 
major part of them, all lawful questions put to him, her or them, by the said commis· 
sioners, or the major part of them, as well by word of mouth, as by interrogatories 
in writing, or shall refuse to sign and subscribe his, her or their examination so 
taken down or reduced into writing as aforesaid (not having a reasonable objection 
either to the wording thereof or otherwise, to be allowed by the said commission• 
ers) it shall and may be lawful to and may be lawful to and for the said commission· 
ers, or the major part of them, by warrant under their hands and seals, to commit 
him, her or them to such prison, as the said commissioners, or the major part of 
them shall think fit, there to remain without bail or mainprize [sic], until such time 
as such person or persons shall submit him, her or themselves to the said commis· 
sioners, and full answer make to the satisfaction of the said commissioners to all 
such questions as shall be put to him, her or them as aforesaid, and sign and sub· 
scribe such examination as aforesaid, according to the true intent and meaning of 
this act. 
Note that this power might be likened to civil contempt, not criminal, because the intent of the power was 
coercive, but the distinction between civil and criminal contempt does not appear to have been robust 
back in this era, so it is difficult, if not impossible, to conjecture what additional powers (if any) the 
commissioners might have had, had the divide been conceived then as significant. 
66Id. Commissioners could then order by warrant the delivery of the incarcerated bankrupt to the 
commissioners to continue the case. The commissioners' powers extended even further, as they could also 
issue a warrant to search "any other person or persons" reasonably suspected of possessing the bankrupt's 
property. Id. It is not entirely clear whether commissioners had the power to issue the warrants them· 
selves, as historical accounts are limited. Section 36 of the 1732 Act indicates that, even if the commis· 
sioners did not possess authority to issue the warrants themselves, commissioners maintained other 
avenues for imprisoning bankrupts: 
Id. at § 36. 
67Jd. 
[I]n case such bankrupt or bankrupts shall neglect or refuse to attend, or, on such 
attendance, shall refuse to assist in such discovery, without good and sufficient 
cause to be shewn [sic] to the commissioners, or the major part of them, ... are 
hereby empowered [sic] and required to issue a warrant or warrants, directed to 
such person or persons as they shall think proper, for apprehending such bankrupt 
or bankrupts .... 
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ings of the commissioners,68 legal commentators of the time were not entirely 
satisfied with such recourse and were quick to criticize the commissioners' 
relatively unfettered status under the overarching bankruptcy procedures of 
the time. Perhaps most famously, Blackstone grumbled that proceedings 
presented before the commissioners were an "extrajudicial method of proceed-
ing, which is allowed merely for the benefit of commerce."69 Blackstone was 
not alone in his critique, as, in 1783, James Bland Burges published a study of 
bankruptcy in England and proposed reform.7° Burges was most critical of 
how Parliament had effectively altered the rights of the English subject to the 
common law, bemoaning the inherent issues in granting "temporary judges" 
operating somewhat aside the traditional courts of law and equity the ability 
to seize property, sell estates, and imprison individuals.71 Burges went so far 
as to claim that individuals "became subject to an unknown law, and were 
excluded from the common blessing of a trial by jury."72 Nonetheless, despite 
Burges' criticism, he did not recommend abandoning the practice of referring 
bankruptcy matters to commissioners, perhaps suggesting that the pragmatic 
functionalism of today's bankruptcy proceedings has an historic pedigree.73 
The system, while perceived to be flawed, was nonetheless accepted. 
Similarly, Edward Christian also examined the unique nature of English 
commissioners.74 Christian likewise observed that commissioners had been 
granted "large and extensive powers."75 In fact, as early as 1583, commission-
ers referred legal matters to the Court of Common Pleas for assistance, which 
later served as the "foundation for the Lord Chancellor's later practice of 
referring legal questions to the law courts."76 The only "broad limitation" to 
the power granted to the commissioners was quasi-appellate: "the power of 
the courts of record-the Lord Chancellor sitting in the Court of Chancery 
or the law courts-to ensure that the commissioners' adjudications con-
68See, e.g., Ex parte Bowes (1798) Eng. Rep. 86, 87, 90-91; 4 Yes. Jun. 168, 170, 176-77 (noting that an 
alleged bankrupt or creditor could petition for the Chancery Court to review the commissioners' findings). 
Parties could also take a more proactive step by filing an action in the law courts or the Court of Chan-
cery, which gives us a robust rational choice explanation of the prevalence of the practice. See Plank, supra 
note 52, at 577 n.62-63. Most of the actions instituted in the law courts were conducted before a jury 
trial. See id. at 577-78 n.66. 
69BLACKSTONE, supra note 58, at • 4 77 (emphasis added). 
70jAMES B. BuRGES, CoNSIDERATIONS ON THE LAw OF INsOLVENCY: WITH A PROPOSAL FOR RE-
FORM (London, T. Cadell 1783). 
7 'Id. at 213-15. 
72/d. at 215. 
73 See Plank, supra note 52, at 592. 
74See 1 & 2 EDWARD CHRISTIAN, THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE BANK· 
RUPT LAW, BOTH IN ENGLAND AND IN IRELAND (2d ed. 1818). 
752 id. at 8. 
76Plank, supra note 52, at 594. 
2017) CRIMINAL CONTEMPT IN BANKRUPTCY COURTS 323 
formed to the requirements of the law."77 To be clear, the Lord Chancellor 
lacked express supervision over the commissioners,78 but he maintained the 
ability to review petitions from bankrupts or creditors who questioned the 
decision of the commissioners, although even that was subject to seemingly 
jurisdictional constraints.79 Further, given the Lord Chancellor's ability to 
appoint new commissioners, there existed a likely unspoken constraint.80 
Still, despite the occasional critique from scholars like Christian (who later 
served as a commissioner himself), Parliament did not alter or reconsider the 
expansive delegation of authority to the commissioners.81 And it is equally 
clear that the commissioners exercised what we would now call "judicial 
power": they had the authority to issue the certificate necessary for discharge 
of the bankrupt, inexorably affecting the property and contract rights of the 
parties,82 albeit subject to confirmation by a court of equity.83 
B. AMERICAN ANALOGUES: PENNSYLVANIA's 1785 AcT 
Pre-Constitution, early iterations of American bankruptcy statutes 
adopted practices similar to those of the English, bestowing upon bankruptcy 
commissioners the power to decide nearly all matters relating to the bank-
ruptcy proceeding.84 Pennsylvania's 1785 Act for the Regulation of Bank-
ruptcy is perhaps most similar to the procedures detailed above. In essence, 
77Id. at 595. "[T]he primary function of the law courts was not the determination of facts by the 
jury[, which was frequently empaneled,] but the resolution of legal questions: the resolution of 'case."' I d. 
at 595 n.173. Rationales behind granting commissioners this authority are rooted in efficiency. See id. at 
596. This discussion of efficiency, and arguably flexibility, perhaps relates to the overarching debate con· 
cerning whether bankruptcy courts are courts of equity. 
78Id. at 594. 
79ld. For constraints on the Chancellor's power to review the judgment of the commissioners, see 
Clar~e v. Capron, (1795) 30 Eng. Rep. 832, 2 Ves. Jun. 666-68. In Clar~e, after the commissioners 
awarded creditors a dividend and the assignees sought to have proof of one of the creditor's debt ex· 
punged, the Lord Chancellor concluded that because the petition had not been raised before the commis· 
sioners entered their order, he could not override the dividend, as it "would totally defeat the summary 
proceeding under commissions." Id. at 669. Clar~e thus demonstrates that, despite the stature of the Lord 
Chancellor, there were limitations on his ability to question the commissioners' decisions. In fact, the Lord 
Chancellor went so far as to claim: "Sitting here I have no more right to reverse an order of the commis· 
sioners than the Court of King's Bench." Id. at 667-68. 
80See 2 CHRISTIAN, supra note 74, at 11-16; accord THOMAS DAVIES, THE LAWS RELATING To 
BANKRUPTS 165 (London, Henry Linton 1744). 
81 There appears to be a deliberate vagueness concerning the procedures during this time, which could 
be in part to some of the economic justifications for granting commissioners this power. See Plank, supra 
note 52, at 596. 
82Commissioners had to certify to the Lord Chancellor "that the bankrupt had made a full discovery of 
his assets and had otherwise complied with the act" as an apparently unreviewable precondition of dis· 
charge. Id. at 589. While the Lord Chancellor was tasked with approving the certificates of discharge, 
"[ t ]he commissioner had full discretion over whether to certify the discharge; the bankrupt could not 
compel the commissioners to do so." Id. 
835 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 10 (1732) (Eng.). 
84See Brubaker, supra note 53, at 124-26. 
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the Act served as a "revised composite of the English bankruptcy acts."85 
Instead of a Lord Chancellor issuing a commission of bankruptcy, the Su-
preme Executive Council was tasked with this duty.86 The American com-
missioners maintained many of the same abilities as their English 
counterparts, including the power to imprison the bankrupt or related per-
sons for failure to appear or to answer questions satisfactorily87 and to 
"[b ]reak open the houses, chambers, shops, warehouses, doors, trunks or 
chests of the bankruptcy and seize the 'body, goods, money and other estate, 
deeds, books of account or other writings' of the bankrupt (directly or by 
warrant authorizing third persons)."88 
Thus, it appears that early bankruptcy commissioners-both in America 
and England-wielded considerable power within their bailiwick of bank-
ruptcy. Given their unique placement as quasi-judicial adjudicators with va-
rying appellate oversight, however, it is difficult to characterize their role as 
exclusively fitting within the tradition of either law or equity.89 They did 
not use juries, and pleadings and processes were summary, but they acted 
pursuant to the bankruptcy statutes and occasionally referred matters to the 
courts of law for interpretation.90 Whatever their proper characterization-
whether the adjudicators were considered "adjuncts" of law, equity, or 
neither-it is clear they had contempt-like power, including the power to 
imprison recalcitrant litigants.91 
85Plank, supra note 52, at 602-03. The first federal bankruptcy statute, the Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 
authori~ed bankruptcy commissioners "to take into their possession, all the estate, real and personal, of 
every nature and description to which the said bankrupt may be entitled, either in law or equity, in any 
manner whatsoever, and cause the same to be inventoried and appraised to the best value." Bankruptcy 
Act of 1800, ch. 19 §5, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803). The 1800 Act gave bankruptcy commissioners power 
over a debtor's estate so complete that a commissioner could "imprison recalcitrant third parties in posses· 
sian of the estate's assets." Cent. Va. Cmty. Call. v. Kat~. 546 U.S. 356, 370 (2006). Similarly, the 
Bankruptcy Acts of 1841 and 1867 gave federal courts jurisdiction over "all matters and proceedings in 
bankruptcy" and authori~ed federal courts to appoint bankruptcy commissioners to exercise that jurisdic· 
tion. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9 § 6, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843); accord Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 
176 § 6, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). 
86Act for the Regulation of Bankruptcy, 1785 PA. STAT. § 23. 
871785 PA. STAT. § 14. 
88Plank, supra note 52, at 605 n.219. The statutes make this sound like civil contempt more than 
criminal contempt. What we would probably consider today as criminal contempt in bankruptcy proceed· 
ings triggered indictment and punishment in pillory with ear removal, but trial had to occur before a Court 
of Record, implying that the bankruptcy commissioners could not effect such punishment on their own. 
See 1785 PA. STAT.§ 14. 
89See Pfander, supra note 51, at 719. 
90See Krieger, supra note 50, at 277-92. 
91 1785 PA. STAT.§§ 13, 15. This authority is largely similar to§ 16 under 1732 English Act. See 
supra notes 61-67. A complementary debate concerns the existential identity of bankruptcy courts-are 
bankruptcy courts truly courts of equity? And, if not, does it matter? We ultimately believe that such a 
distinction does not matter for present purposes. In reaching this conclusion, we share two observations: 
(1) the statutory constitution of bankruptcy courts does not preclude their being "courts of equity"; and 
(2) Supreme Court constraints on equitable powers, per Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance 
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After considering the history and role of bankruptcy commissioners, we 
are ready to engage in an informed analysis of the statutory and constitu-
tional considerations underlying the question whether today's bankruptcy 
judges have the authority to exercise criminal contempt power. 
III. STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS 
A. INHERENT AuTHORITY: Is STATUTORY AuTHORIZATION EvEN 
REQUIRED? 
Can today's bankruptcy courts issue criminal contempt orders? For 
some, if not many, that inquiry raises the antecedent question whether bank-
ruptcy courts have been authorized by statute to do so. Long-gone are the 
days of common law crime and, indeed, Congress has a contempt statute in 
the Criminal Code.92 Thus, at first blush, it might seem that for criminal 
contempt, enabling legislation is required as a precondition for bankruptcy 
court authority. 
We are not so sure, because contempt is a curious legal beast that seems 
to have at least some component ontologically interwoven into the definition 
of "court."93 As early as 1873, in Ex Parte Robinson, the Supreme Court 
noted that "[ t ]he power to punish for con tempts is inherent in all courts; its 
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and 
to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and 
consequently to the due administration of justice."94 Robinson, which dealt 
with the minor misdeeds of a lawyer who was disbarred, is a foundational 
U.S. case for the conception of inherent authority. The language above is a 
frequent starting point of both judicial and scholarly work on contempt.95 
Yet important as this broad pronouncement was, it was not absolute. Of 
particular importance to the Court was the unproblematic fact that "the 
[contempt] power ha[ d] been limited and defined by the act of Congress of 
Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999), are inapposite, because contempt has been around since the origin of 
courts. For a full account of the issues, see Adam]. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Ban~­
ruptcy: Judicial Lawma~ing in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2006), and Alan M. Ahart, The 
Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Ban~ruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of Ban~ruptcy, N.ot a Court of 
Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2005). 
92 18 U.S.C. § 401. 
93See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) ("Certain implied powers must necessarily 
result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution ... which cannot be dispensed with in a 
Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others."); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 
447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)(citing Hudson); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821) ("Courts of justice 
are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, 
and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates."). 
94Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873). 
95See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,44 (1991) (White,].); Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton 
et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 795 (1987) (Brennan,].); Laura B. Bartell, Contempt of the Ban~ruptcy Court-A 
N.ew Lao~, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 1, 1 n.2. 
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March 2d, 1831,"96 which specified that lower courts were limited to ad-
dressing contempt in the following instances: 
1st, where there has been misbehavior of a person in the 
presence of the courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice; 2d, where there has been misbehav-
ior of any officer of the courts in his official transactions; and, 
3d, where there has been disobedience or resistance by any 
officer, party, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful 
writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of the courts.97 
The Court's recognition of a congressional prerogative to circumscribe or 
delineate the contempt power continued in its discussion of the seventeenth 
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789.98 Courts derived the power "to punish 
[con tempts] by fine or imprisonment" from this Act,99 which, in the eyes of 
the Court, proved to be more than ample authority to police litigants, render-
ing it unnecessary to call upon any inherent powers the court might nonethe-
less possess.100 In recognition of the statutory restriction to these 
punishments alone, the Court declined to uphold the lower court's additional 
sanction of disbarment, finding "fine or imprisonment" adequate. 101 The 
Court's terse opinion in Robinson also cautioned that courts must not hap-
hazardly invoke such power, sounding in rights that we would now consider 
moored in due process: "The principle that there must be citation before hear-
ing, and hearing or opportunity of being heard before judgment, is essential to 
the security of all private rights." 102 
It was not until a little over a century later, in Chambers v. N.ASCO, 
Inc., that the Court had the opportunity to seriously revisit the contempt 
power, holding that it is "firmly established" that contempt, whether pro-
vided for by statute or not, is an "inherent power" of all courts. 103 Finding 
that this criminal power is inherent, however, need not create a common law 
crime. While contempt may seem like a common law crime, it exists as a sui 
generis incidence of a court's existence, something engrained in the court's 
structure.104 Yet existence of a power is one thing, but scope is another. 
96Robinson, 86 U.S. at 510. 
97 Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487, quoted in Robinson, 86 U.S. at 511. 
98Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
99Jd. 
100Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 512 (1873). 
lOIJd. 
102Id. at 513. The Court also appeared to have due process concerns when stating that, in regard to 
the contemnor, "before judgment disbarring him can be rendered he should have notice of the grounds of 
complaint against him and ample opportunity of explanation and defence [sic]." Id. at 512. 
103501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (citing Robinson, 86 U.S. at 510); see also Bartell, supra note 95, at 1 n.2 
(reviewing and critically evaluating precedent concerning the inherent power of bankruptcy courts). 
104See Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924) (noting contempt is a sui generis proceeding); 
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Thus, the questions remain as to the scope of this "inherent authority" with 
regard to criminal contempt. For example, is it only direct contempt power 
that is inherent, which would require indirect contempt to be grounded in 
statute? And even if there is an inherent, inalienable contempt power of 
courts that requires no congressional authorization, how much can Congress 
"shape" the exercise of this inherent power by prescribing limits on its execu-
tion, without affronting the separation of powers, such as those apparently 
found unremarkable in Robinson?105 
The Court wrestled with the issue of inherent authority to impose pun-
ishment in Chambers.106 The case stemmed from a terminated business 
transaction between Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc. ("CTR") and 
NASCO, Inc. ("'NASCO"). In it, G. Russell Chambers ("Chambers"), the 
sole shareholder and director of CTR, executed a contract to sell his business 
and broadcast license to NASCO. The deal required the FCC approval; 
however, before the parties agreed upon the filing date with the FCC, Cham-
bers reneged. NASCO filed suit, and Chambers and his attorneys obfuscated 
the judicial proceedings by engaging in both unethical and abusive conduct, 
such as "(1) attempt[ing] to deprive this [c]ourt of jurisdiction by acts of 
fraud, nearly all of which were performed outside the confines of th[ e district 
c]ourt, (2) fil[ing] false and frivolous pleadings, and (3) attempt[ing], by 
other tactics of delay, oppression, harassment and massive expense to reduce 
plaintiff to exhausted compliance."107 (In the taxonomy of contempt, these 
transgressions would be considered indirect contempt because, at least argua-
bly, they did not occur in the presence of the judge.)108 
After reviewing the litigant's unsavory conduct,109 the lower courts did 
not find satisfaction in the punishment provided for in either 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, which prescribes financial penalties against "attorney[s] or other per-
United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844, 845, 849 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (finding that § 401 "is 
supported by the Supreme Court's consistent categorization of criminal contempt as a sui generis offense"). 
105Some courts discussing inherent power address the "dignity" of Article III courts, see, e.g., Bingman, 
100 F.3d at 658 (9th Cir. 1996). But surely sanctioning is an essential, if not oft-invoked, power of all 
courts, regardless of their Article III status. In fact, such inherent authority even extends to certain 
Article I courts. See Dixon v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1803 (2000) (imposing additional sanctions, 
some of which were on the grounds of inherent power); Westreco, Inc. v. Comm'r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 824 
(1990) (same). Given that the Tax Court possesses statutory contempt power, see 26 U.S.C. § 7456(c), 
resort to inherent authority for contempt is unlikely. 
106501 U.S. 32 (1991). 
107ld. at 41 (citation omitted). The district court characterized the conduct as "'emasculat[ing) and 
frustrat[ing) the purposes of th[ e] rules and the powers of the [ c ]ourt .. .'." I d. at 36. 
108Despite the fact that the Court characterized the bulk of the acts as indirect contempt, it is possible 
to argue that some of them could be characterized as direct. See id. at 56-57 (detailing that "nearly" all the 
conduct occurred outside the courtroom). 
109Such acts consisted of the filing of frivolous motions and pleadings, as well as the violation of a 
preliminary injunction by refusing to allow the other party to inspect CTR's corporate records. Id. at 
38-39. 
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son[ s] admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States ... who 
so multipl[y] the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously[,]"1 10 
or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, with its well-known prohibition on 
abusive pleadings. 111 The trial court had found § 1927 inapplicable because 
"the statute applies only to attorneys, and therefore would not reach Cham-
bers [a self-styled "'strategist"], and additionally because the statute was not 
broad enough to reach 'acts which degrade the judicial system,' including 'at-
tempts to deprive the Court of jurisdiction, fraud, misleading and lying to the 
Court.'"112 Similarly, Rule 11 simply did not fit the acts in question given 
the timing of the bulk of the wrongful acts: "the falsity of the pleadings at 
issue did not become apparent until after the trial on the merits, so that it 
would have been impossible to [as Rule 11 requires] assess sanctions at the 
time the papers were filed." 113 Thus, the question was whether the aghast 
trial court could impose its own sanctions under its inherent authority, even 
if the provisions of § 1927 or Rule 11 were not triggered, or whether it was 
bound to the confines of those statutory and rules-based provisions and could 
not go beyond them. The contemnor argued that the statute and rule "occu-
pied the field," so to speak, and thus the trial court's imposition of sanctions 
under inherent authority was improper.l 1 4 
In a divided opinion, the Court found that the trial court was not bound 
by these statutes and rules and could always resort to its inherent author-
ity.U5 Provided a contemnor receives an "'appropriate hearing ... the party 
may be sanctioned for abuses of process occurring beyond the courtroom, 
such as disobeying the court's orders," notwithstanding the restrictions on 
Rule 11 to conduct in the pleadings and § 1927 to attorneys.U6 The major-
ity thus embraced the notion of inherent authority, but it did not see this 
decision as uprooting the precedent that Congress can play a role in delineat-
ing the scope of that power. It reminded readers that although Congress can-
not outright preempt the inherent authority of federal courts, it can tinker 
and limit such authority "'by statute or rule[.]" 11 7 The Court did not, consis-
11028 u.s.c. § 1927. 
111 FED. R. C!V. P. 11. 
112Chambers, 501 at 41-43 (citations omitted). 
113Id. at 41 (citation omitted). 
114Id. at 42-43. 
115Id. at 46-51. 
116Id. at 57; see also Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (reminding that inherent 
powers are "governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage 
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases"). 
117Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47 (citing Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 512 (1873)). 
There is, therefore, nothing in the other sanctioning mechanisms or prior cases in-
terpreting them that warrants a conclusion that a federal court may not, as a matter 
of law, resort to its inherent power to impose attorney's fees as a sanction for bad-
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tent with its hesitance toward over-specification of the contempt power, ex-
plicate what permissible constraints Congress could enact by statute or 
delegate to the Court by rule. 118 
Justice Scalia's dissent was unusual because it seemed at first to be a 
concurrence, arguing for an inherent authority of courts that was immune 
from congressional abrogation. "Some elements of [ ] inherent authority are 
so essential to the '[t]he judicial Power,' ... that they are indefeasible, among 
which is a court's ability to enter orders protecting the integrity of its pro-
ceedings."119 Thus, while agreeing this core domain carried a quasi-inaliena-
ble right of the judiciary to reach beyond procedural rules and statutes and 
into inherent authority,120 Justice Scalia quarreled "with the Court's state-
ment that a court's inherent power reaches conduct "'beyond the court's con-
fines'" that does not "'interfer[e] with the conduct of trial."' 121 Turning to 
those inalienable powers, he also stressed restraint in light of the unchecked 
criminal power of the judiciary to punish, admonishing that "[a] court must 
use the prescribed means [to protect their proceedings] unless for some rea-
son they are inadequate."122 Justice Scalia found contempt unnecessary here 
where Rule 11 sanctions would have sufficed.123 
It thus seems fair to ask whether statutory authorization is even required 
for bankruptcy court criminal contempt if we accept, following Chambers, 
that not all contempt authority requires such authorization because it stems 
from inherent powers of the court itself, intrinsic in the definition of what it 
means to be a court. Yet the dividing line is unclear between "inherent" 
criminal contempt power and "statutorily authorized" criminal contempt 
power. Certainly Justice Scalia's division between contempt powers Con-
gress can preempt and powers upon which Congress cannot intrude is a plau-
Id. at 50. 
faith conduct. This is plainly the case where the conduct at issue is not covered by 
one of the other sanctioning provisions. 
118See id. at 47-48. 
119ld. at 58 (Scalia,]., dissenting). As the Court itself previously pronounced: 
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the 
nature of their institution. To fine for contempt-imprison for contumacy-in· 
force the observance of order, & c. are powers which cannot be dispensed with in 
[sic] a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others: and so far our 
Courts no doubt possess powers not immediately derived from statute .... 
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812). 
120See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 58-60 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
121 Jd. at 60 (citation omitted). 
122Jd. 
123See id. Justice Scalia was not alone in his stance, as Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Souter and 
Kennedy dissented on the merits, finding resort to criminal contempt facially improper in light of the 
availability of other procedural mechanisms (even though these Justices declined to embrace Justice Scalia's 
conception of the contempt power). See id. at 60-63 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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sible one, sounding in the direct/indirect contempt divide, but it sheds no 
light on the corollary question: do perhaps some of the more "'peripheral" 
forms of contempt power require congressional authorization? 
Moreover, even if there is a core of inherent criminal contempt authority 
that requires no statutory authorization, a further complication asks 
whether-wherever that scope of inalienable inherent authority is-can (or 
even must?) the line be drawn differently for federal courts, like bankruptcy 
courts, presided over by judges who lack the full protections of Article III? 
Full exploration of this important question must be bracketed until this Arti-
cle turns to the constitutional jurisprudence regarding the bankruptcy courts' 
exercise of judicial power, but two signposts can be considered at present. 
First, while inherent authority has been recognized in so-called Article I 
courts that fall under the public rights exception to Article III, such as the 
Tax Court,124 that court also has an explicit statutory grant of contempt 
power, complete with restrictions.125 So the Tax Court example tells us 
both that Article I courts can exercise criminal contempt, but also that the 
authority has been prescribed by statute, leaving us little more informed on 
whether the statutory grant is required or whether it could otherwise flow 
from this inherent power. 
Second, the Supreme Court has given indications that bankruptcy courts 
do indeed have at least some inherent powers, although it is not clear 
whether they would include criminal contempt. Most notable in recent 
years was the Court's decision in Marrama v. Citizens Ban~ of Massachu-
124 One source of authority must necessarily be implied from the power of the [Tax] 
Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure. The second source of authority 
is inherent in the Court's obligation, as a judicial body, to protect the integrity of 
its processes and to regulate the proceedings and parties or representatives of par-
ties that appear before the Court. These sources of authority adequately empower 
the Court to prevent any party from undermining the Court's discovery Rules. 
Westreco, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 824 (1990); see also Dixon, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 1803 (2000) (imposing addi-
tional sanctions, some of which were on the grounds of inherent power). 
12526 U.S.C. § 7456(c); see also supra note 105 (discussing the Tax Court's contempt power). As one 
commentator explains: 
The Tax Court was established in 1942 as an independent agency in the Executive 
Branch succeeding the Board of Tax Appeals created in 1924. The 1969 Tax Re-
form Act gave the Tax Court the status of a Constitutional court, making it part of 
the Legislative Branch of Government .... The Tax Court now has the same 
power as a U.S. District Court to punish contempt and to enforce its orders. . . . A 
Tax Court decision may be appealed to the federal Court of Appeals for the appro-
priate circuit. 
James Thurston, Attorney's Fees for Prevailing Taxpayers, 19 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 237, 242 n.29 
(1989) (citation omitted). The Tax Court also possesses additional sanctioning power pursuant to Rule 
104(c) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure, which authori~es the use of contempt for disobedience of 
court orders. See I.R.C. Rule 104(c)(3) (2016). Congress has also statutorily granted other non-Article III 
courts, such as military courts-martial, direct contempt power with a set penalty. See 10 U .S.C. § 848. 
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setts. 126 That case has been described as an important return to historical 
practice from case law that had previously limited "exercise of judicial discre-
tion by bankruptcy courts."127 Marrama dealt with a chapter 7 debtor who 
misrepresented the value of his real property and concealed the fact that he 
had transferred any property in the preceding year. 128 Once the true value of 
his property was determined, and the trustee notified Marrama's counsel that 
he was going to seize the property as an asset of the estate, Marrama at-
tempted to convert the case to chapter 13, in order to divest the trustee of 
control. 129 The bankruptcy court determined that Marrama's actions consti-
tuted bad faith and barred conversion of his case under its inherent power 
and/or§ 105_13° Justice Stevens, for the Court, reinforced the inherent sanc-
tioning power of courts, noting that even in the absence of a textual basis, a 
bankruptcy court maintains the inherent authority to perform certain func-
tions and has "used [such] statutory and equitable authority to craft various 
remedies for a range of bad faith conduct: requiring accounting or reporting of 
assets; enjoining debtors from alienating estate property; penalizing counsel; 
assessing costs and fees; or holding the debtor in contempt."131 Justice Stevens 
stressed the familiar notion that this power must not be used in contraven-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code, but only supplementally.1 32 
Marrama's vitality on this point, however, was subsequently called into 
question by Law v. Siegel. 133 While not repudiating Marrama's discussion 
suggesting the existence of the bankruptcy court's inherent power, Law was 
hardly effusive in its characterization, relegating discussion of this question to 
dictum. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, harrumphed that, "[a]t most, 
Marrama's dictum suggests that in some circumstances a bankruptcy court 
may be authorized to dispense with futile procedural niceties in order to 
reach more expeditiously an end result required by the Code."134 He further 
reminded, "Marrama most certainly did not endorse, even in dictum, the view 
that equitable considerations permit a bankruptcy court to contravene ex-
126549 U.S. 365 (2007). 
127Jeffrey W. Warren & Shane G. Ramsey, Revisiting the Inherent Equitable Powers of the Bankruptcy 
Court: Does Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts Signal a Return to Equity?, 26 AM. BANKR. lNST. 
]. 22, Apr. 2007, at 63. 
128See Marrama, 549 U.S. at 368. 
129Id. at 368-69. 
130Id. at 369-70. 
mId. at 383 (emphasis added). 
132See id. ("[W]hatever steps a bankruptcy court may take pursuant to § 105(a) or its general equita· 
ble powers, a bankruptcy court cannot contravene the provisions of the Code."); In re Terex Corp., 984 
F.2d 170, 173 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Energy Resources Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990)) 
("The bankruptcy court's equitable actions, however, cannot contravene specific provisions of the Bank· 
ruptcy Code."). 
133 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014). 
134Id. at 1197 (2014) (emphasis added). 
332 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 91 
press provisions of the Code."135 He closed by assuring that the Court's 
"decision today does not denude bankruptcy courts of the essential 'authority 
to respond to debtor misconduct with meaningful sanctions."'136 The best 
read of Law is thus of tepid ongoing support for bankruptcy court inherent 
power. It does seem to accept that there is "some" power, whether under 
§ 105 alone or also under inherent power, at least to sanction. But, clearly, 
even after Law, the extent of that power to impose criminal contempt re-
mains unexplored at best. 
Accordingly, while it seems appropriate to conclude bankruptcy courts 
possess at least a modicum of inherent authority to sanction, and presumably 
(although not explicitly) to find a party in contempt, it is equally appropriate 
to be cautious and assume that not all, if any, of the criminal contempt power, 
especially for indirect contempt, can be securely grounded in the inherent 
power of the bankruptcy court. This is perhaps especially so if one finds 
important the historical practice, where (as best as we can tell) contempt-like 
powers, while routinely deployed, were usually exercised under a statutory 
grant of authority. As such, this Article proceeds on the assumption that 
statutory authorization is required for the imposition of criminal contempt-
but it does so "arguendo only," given that the power may well already exist 
inherently. Thus, the hunt for a statutory grant of bankruptcy court criminal 
contempt authority continues. 
B. 18 U.S.C. § 401 
Looking at statutes for a grant of authority for contempt, a starting 
point-and, one (nai:Vely) might think, an ending point-is the general federal 
criminal contempt statute, found at 18 U.S.C. § 401. The statute provides 
that "[a] court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or 
imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and 
none other," and limits it to the following: "(1) [m]isbehavior of any person in 
its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; (2) 
[m]isbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; [and] (3) 
[ d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or 
command."137 Reliance on § 401 as the statutory basis for bankruptcy court 
contempt authority is stymied, however, because of an important wrinkle: it 
is not clear that bankruptcy courts are "courts of the United States" for 
purposes of this statute. (And yes, it is possible that "courts" might be de-
fined differently based on context. For example, the Tax Court was held to 
be a "Court of Law" for purposes of the Appointments Clause, 138 but 
135Jd. 
136Id. at 1198. 
13718 u.s.c. § 401. 
138See Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 888 (1991) ("[The Appointments] Clause does not limit the 
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whether it is a "'court of the United States" under § 401 has yet to be deter-
mined. Frustratingly, this question is unlikely ever to be resolved, given the 
specific grant of authority for Tax Court contempt under 26 U.S.C. 
§ 7546(c); that renders resort to § 401 presumably unnecessary.) 
The reason why the bankruptcy courts may not be courts of the United 
States pertains to the tortured history of the briefly lived-and unconstitu-
tional-recomposition of the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 Code. 
When Congress tried to make bankruptcy courts full-fledged "adjunct" courts 
(whatever that meant), with co-equal adjudicative power to the district 
courts in an expanded domain of matters "'related to" bankruptcy, and yet not 
accord bankruptcy judges the life-tenure protections of Article III back in 
1978, the provisions were swiftly struck down by the Court in Northern 
Pipeline.139 One provision of that ill-fated law expanded the definition of 
"courts of the United States," to explicitly include these new bankruptcy 
courts. 140 In its scramble to largely codify the Emergency Rule that filled the 
gap after the 1978 provisions were invalidated, Congress deleted this lan-
guage in the 1984 Act, 141 leading to the negative implication that the new 
new bankruptcy courts - now styled "'units" of the District Court - were no 
longer "courts of the United States."14 2 
This implication may be sound. After all, part of the justification of the 
revised bankruptcy court structure's compliance with Article III was that 
the bankruptcy courts returned to their pre-1978 subservience to the district 
courts, reliant on voluntary references of jurisdiction from the district 
court-references that could be withdrawn. 143 As such, it seems a bit rich 
to say in one breath that they are not separate courts from the district courts 
but in another to say that they are nonetheless their own "courts" of the 
United States. Then again, mere deletion of a provision that may have been 
redundant in the first place seems a poor basis to divine congressional intent 
of anything. Certainly, in a cognate context (although not without disagree-
"Courts of Law" to those courts established under Article III . . . . The Appointments Clause does not 
provide that Congress can vest appointment power only in "one Supreme Court" and other courts estab· 
lished under Article III, or only in tribunals that exercise broad common-law jurisdiction."); see U.S. 
Canst., art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
139458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (invalidating bankruptcy courts' grant of general jurisdiction under the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95·598, 92 Stat. 2549). 
140Pub. L. No. 95·598, § 213, 92 Stat. 2549, 2661 (1978). 
141Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98·353, 98 Stat. 333, 336 
(1984) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)). For the .full text of the Emergency Rule, see White Motor 
Corp. v. Citibank, NA., 704 F.2d 254, 265-67 (6th Cir. 1983). 
142Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98·353, 98 Stat. 333, 336 
(1984) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)). · 
14328 U.S.C. § 157(d); see also Laura B. Bartell, Motions to Withdraw the Reference • an Empirical 
Study, 89 AM. BANKR. LJ 397 (2015) (surveying effects of 157(d)); cf Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 
30 Stat. 544, 546 (as amended) (repealed 1979) (employing reference system of, literally, "referees"). 
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ment), bankruptcy courts have been deemed "courts established by an act of 
Congress" for purposes of the All Writs Act.144 Moreover, even if one 
makes the argument that the bankruptcy courts are not their own "courts" of 
the United States, then that conclusion simply raises the necessary follow-up: 
Well, what are they?145 And the answer, following the logic of the chain, is 
that they are mere units of the district court-which everyone agrees are 
courts of the United States. Thus, we are left not so much with a classifica-
tion question but a delegation question: can bankruptcy judges exercise the 
contempt authority of district courts within the scope of their duly referred 
jurisdiction? 146 
Accordingly, while there are decent arguments that the bankruptcy 
courts are indeed "'courts of the United States" for purposes of§ 401, or at 
the very least that bankruptcy judges are officers who may exercise the au-
thority of the district courts of the United States, there is enough uncer-
tainty that, once again, it seems imprudent to rely upon this statute as the 
grant of authority for bankruptcy judges to exercise criminal contempt.147 
The search must continue. 
144See In re lnt'l Power Sec. Corp., 170 F.2d 399, 402 (3d Cir. 1948); In re Stanwyck, 450 B.R. 181, 
200 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011); In re GTI Capital Holdings, LLC, 420 B.R. 1, 11 (Bankr. D. Ar~. 2009) 
(citations omitted). 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), referred to as the 'All Writs Act,' '[t]he Supreme 
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary 
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdiction and agreeable usages and princi-
ples of law.' Bankruptcy courts, being courts established by Act of Congress, 'have 
the power to regulate vexatious litigation pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 105 and 28 
u.s.c. § 1651.' 
G'TI Capital Holdings, LLC, 420 B.R. at 11. But cf In re O~enne, 818 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding, 
in short-lived opinion prior to its withdrawal and vacatur, that Bankruptcy Appellate Panels lack jurisdic-
tion to issue writs of mandamus pursuant to the All Writs Act because they were not "established by an 
Act of Congress"), vacated, 828 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2016). The All Writs Act is codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1651(a) (2000). 
145See David S. Kennedy & Tisha L. Federico, If the United States Ban~ruptcy Court Is Not a "Court 
of the United States," 'Then What Is It7, 28 U. MEM. L. REv. 859 (1998) (highlighting the debate in 
defining bankruptcy courts in in forma pauperis proceedings); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (detailing proceed-
ings in forma pauperis and relevant language from statute). 
146Professor Laura Bartell seems negatively inclined, opining that any attempt to "search for the con-
tempt power of the bankruptcy court, as if that entity were some congressionally created judicial body," 
will be "misled by titles and ignore the reality of the amendments wrought by BAFJA." Bartell, supra 
note 95, at 28. She further complains that a "bankruptcy judge wielding the contempt power is a sheep in 
the wolfs clothing of a 'judicial officer of the district court' exercising the authority of an Article Ill 
judge." Id. Others have different takes. See, e.g., United States v. Guariglia, 962 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 
1992) (finding, in approving a contempt award, that "a district court may, in the first instance, punish for 
criminal contempt a violation of an order of a bankruptcy court where the bankruptcy court is a 'unit' of 
the district court imposing the punishment"). 
147This might be especially so given § 401's different treatment of magistrate judges, judicial officers 
who bear intentional similarity to bankruptcy judges. 
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C. 11 U.S.C. § 105 (AND RELATED CoNTEMPT RuLES) 
The next logical place for a statutory grant of authority for bankruptcy 
courts to issue criminal contempt orders is 11 U.S.C. § 105, the Bankruptcy 
Code's catch-all provision.l48 Section 105, in part, provides that "[t]he court 
may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to 
carry out the provisions of this title."149 To say that § 105 and its progeni-
tors under prior Acts have been altered and amended throughout history is 
an understatement. In fact, as it stands today, the provision is nearly four 
times the length of the original enactment. 150 
Prior to the first permanent bankruptcy act of 1898,151 courts under the 
various ad hoc bankruptcy legislations in the 19th century had power to 
punish contemnors, but only for direct contempt.l52 The 1898 Act devel-
oped this contempt power with several relevant provisions, §§ 2(13), (15), 
and (16). These terms provided bankruptcy courts with the jurisdiction to 
"(13) enforce obedience by bankrupts, officers, and other persons to all lawful 
orders, by fine or imprisonment; ... (15) make such orders, issue such process, 
and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for, as 
may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act;153 [and] 
148See, e.g., Steve H. Nickles & David G. Epstein, Another Way of 'Thin~ing About Section 105(a) and 
Other Sources of Supplemental Law Under the Ban~ruptcy Code, 3 CHAP. L. REv. 7, 8 (2000) (characteri~· 
ing § 105 as the Code's ~catch-all~ provision). 
149 11 U.S.C. § 105(a); see also John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., LLC, 475 B.R. at 595 (E.D. Mich. 
2012), affd sub nom, In re John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 552 F. App'x 401 (6th Cir. 2013) (~[A]n order 
need not be strictly 'necessary' under § 105(a); the phrase 'necessary or appropriate' is disjunctive, rather 
than conjunctive."). Contra Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1193 (9th Cir. 2003) (~[T]he language of§ 105(a) autho· 
ri.4es only those remedies 'necessary' to enforce the bankruptcy code."). Judicial opinions vary in their 
interpretation of this essential provision. For an example on the generous end of the spectrum, see United 
States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549 (1990) (noting that the ~statutory directive" of§ 105 is 
~consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, [which] have 
broad authority to modify creditor-debtor relationships). Whatever its proper interpretation,§ 105 serves 
an essential role in the bankruptcy judge's toolkit and has now come to achieve commonplace reliance. See 
Richard L. Levine, An Enhanced Conception of the Ban~ruptcy Judge: From Case Administrator to Unbi· 
ased Adjudicator, 84 W.VA. L. REv. 637, 653 (1982) (noting that, even in 1982, courts ~ha[d] begun to 
develop a concept of [§ 105 as having] almost unlimited power~). 
150See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 1J 105.LH (Lawrence P. King et a!. eds. 16th ed., rev. 2011). 
151Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 29 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979). Prior limited duration acts were 
enacted in 1800 (see Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19,2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 
248.), 1841 (see Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 
614.), and 1867 (see Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 
20 Stat. 99.). For a thoughtful and reflective historical critique of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, see David 
A. Skeel, Jr., 'The Genius of the 1898 Ban~ruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEvs. J. 321 (1999) and, for a general 
overview of bankruptcy history, see DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT's DoMINION: A HISTORY OF BANK· 
RUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA (2003). 
152See Plank, supra note 52, at 576 n.57. 
153Section 2(a)( 15) harkens back to the All Writs Act and to two sections of the First Judiciary Act of 
1787. See Daniel B. Bogart, Resisting the Expansion of Ban~ruptcy Court Power Under Section 105 of the 
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(16) punish persons for contempts committed before referees. ." 154 Two 
observations from the 1898 Act provisions are warranted. First, under§ 41, 
the referees in bankruptcy did not have specific authority to enter contempt 
orders; even for direct contempt, they were limited to certifying findings of 
contempt to the district court, which had to enter the final order (albeit in a 
summary manner for direct contempt allegations).155 Second, Congress ex-
plicitly specified the parameters of contempt by statute; there is no such leg-
islative detail in the 1978 Code. 156 
In 1964, roughly seventy years after the first Act, Congress enacted 
§ 2075 of Title 28,157 supplementing§ 30 of the 1898 Act, which was gov-
erned by "General Orders in Bankruptcy and Official Forms that were 
adopted by the Supreme Court."158 Section 2075 expressly provided for the 
promulgation of rules that "shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substan-
tive right."159 Under its power conferred under § 2075, the Supreme Court 
adopted, in 1973, Bankruptcy Rules and Official Bankruptcy Forms, super-
seding earlier bankruptcy orders. Not only did this enactment transform the 
title of "Referee in Bankruptcy" to the now-used "Bankruptcy Judge," 160 but 
it also introduced former Bankruptcy Rule 920 ("Rule 920"). 161 Rule 920 
allowed bankruptcy judges to issue small-fine contempt orders directly ($250 
Ban~ruptcy Code: 'The All Writs Act and an Admonition from Chief justice Marshall, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.]. 
793, 799 (2003). 
I d. 
154Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 546 (as amended) (repealed 1979). 
155 SEC. 41. CONTEMPTS BEFORE REFEREES. A person shall not, in proceedings 
before a referee, (1) disobey or resist any lawful order; process, or writ; (2) misbe-
have during a hearing or so near the place thereof as to obstruct the same; (3) 
neglect to produce, after having been ordered to do so, any pertinent document; or 
( 4) refuse to appear after having been subpoenaed, or, upon appearing, refuse to take 
the oath as a witness, or, after having taken the oath, refuse to be examined accord-
ing to law: Provided, That no person shall be required to attend as a witness before 
a referee at a place outside of the State of his residence, and more than one hundred 
miles from such place of residence, and only in case his lawful mileage and fee for 
one day's attendance shall be first paid or tendered to him. The referee shall certify 
the facts to the judge, if any person shall do any of the things forbidden in this 
section. The judge shall thereupon, in a summary manner, hear the evidence as to 
the acts complained of, and, if it is such as to warrant him in so doing, punish such 
person in the same manner and to the same extent as for a contempt committed 
before the court of bankruptcy, or commit such person upon the same conditions as 
if the doing of the forbidden act had occurred with reference to the process of, or in 
the presence of, the court. 
156Cf 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (containing now only § 105). 
15728 U.S.C. § 2075 (1964) (amended). 
158Belinda K. Orem, 'The Impenitent Contemnor: 'The Power of the Ban~ruptcy Courts to Imprison, 25 
CAL. BANKR. J. 222, 224 n.13 (2000). 
15928 U.S.C. § 2075. 
16°FED. R. BANKR. P. 901(7) (as amended in 1973; renumbered as Rule 7001 in 1983). 
161!n full, Former Rule 920 read: 
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or less) without certification to the district court. If the bankruptcy judge 
believed that contumacious behavior necessitated imprisonment or a fine ex· 
ceeding $250, the then-standard process of certifying facts to the district 
court governed.l62 Depending on one's perspective, the rule's partial dispens· 
ing with certification either impermissibly expanded the power of bankruptcy 
judges to issue contempt orders in contravention of§ 2075, or was an incre· 
mental exercise of the inherent powers of the courts to police direct con· 
tempt that was never Congress' prerogative to circumscribe in the first 
place.163 
Notably, Justice Douglas dissented to the rule's passage. 164 Despite his 
Rule 920. Contempt Proceedings. 
(a) Contempt committed in proceedings before referee. 
(1) Summary disposition by referee-Misbehavior prohibited by § 41a (2) of the 
Act may be punished summarily by the referee as contempt if he saw or heard the 
conduct constituting the contempt and it was committed in his actual presence. 
The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by the referee and 
entered of record. 
(2) Disposition by referee upon notice and hearing-Any other conduct prohibited 
by § 41a of the Act may be punished by the referee only after hearing on notice. 
The notice shall be in writing and shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing 
a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential 
facts constituting the contempt charged and whether the contempt is criminal or 
civil or both. The notice may be given on the referee's own initiative or on motion 
by a party, by the United States attorney, or by an attorney appointed by the 
referee for that purpose. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism 
of the referee, he is disqualified from presiding at the hearing except with the con• 
sent of the person charged. 
(3) Limits on punishment by referee-A referee shall not order imprisonment nor 
impose a fine of more than $250 as punishment for any contempt, civil or criminal. 
(4) Certification to district judge-If it appears to a referee that conduct prohibited 
by § 41a of the Act may warrant punishment by imprisonment or by a fine of more 
than $250, he may certify the facts to the district judge. On such certification the 
judge shall proceed as for a contempt not committed in his presence. 
(b) Contempt committed in proceedings before district judge-Any contempt com· 
mitted in proceedings before a district judge while acting as a bankruptcy judge 
shall be prosecuted as any other contempt of the district court. 
(c) Right to jury trial-Nothing in this rule shall be construed to impair the right 
to jury trial whenever it otherwise exists. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 920(4) (repealed 1983). 
162Jd. 
163Cf Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,29 Stat. 544, § 41 (repealed 1979) (requiring referee certifica· 
tion of all matters of contempt). 
164"[I]t is for me alarming to vest appointees of [the] bankruptcy courts with the power to punish for 
contempt . . . . Extension of the contempt power to administrative arms of the bankruptcy court is not 
consistent with close confinement of the contempt power." In re Reed, 11 B.R. 258, 264 n.7 (Bankr. D. 
Utah 1981) (citation omitted). Justice Douglas went on to comment on the "minor" role that proponents 
claimed this statute would have. His concern, while not without merit, appears to be almost reactionary. 
Id. (noting that although the Advisory Notes state the grant is "minor," the Rule changes Sec. 41, "which 
has been with us at least since 1898"). 
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concern, however, it seems that the promulgation of this rule, as evidenced by 
an Advisory Committee Note, was recognition of a court's inherent power to 
enforce orders and to punish the violation of such orders.165 
If Rule 920 was an incremental (and for some, like Justice Douglas, inva-
lid) advancement of bankruptcy judge contempt authority, the ill-fated 1978 
Code was a leaping stride. Three provisions of the 1978 Code plausibly ex-
panded the bankruptcy courts' contempt power, although two of the three 
were later repealed. First, as discussed above, the new bankruptcy courts 
were designated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 451 as "courts of the United 
States": 
The term 'court of the United States' includes the Supreme 
Court of the United States, courts of appeals, district courts 
constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of 
International Trade and any court created by Act of Con-
gress the judges of which are entitled to hold office during 
good behavior, and bankruptcy courts, the judges of which 
are entitled to hold office for a term of 14 years. 166 
This statutory designation in § 451 made clear that the statutory contempt 
power of 18 U.S.C. § 401 for "courts of the United States" explicitly applied 
to bankruptcy courts.167 
Second, 28 U.S.C. § 1481 announced for good measure that "[a] bank-
ruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law, and admi-
ralty."168 This prescription assured that inherent authority, to the extent it 
includes contempt, could not be less in bankruptcy courts than it is in the 
district courts. That said, Congress' conferral of this expansive authority on 
the new bankruptcy courts, while remarkable, also placed restrictions on 
165 The premise of the change in procedure for dealing with minor contempts is that 
the certification requirement of§ 41b of the Act [11 U.S.C. § 69(b) (1976) (re· 
pealed 1978)] has in effect deprived the referee of the necessary power to protect 
proceedings before him from petty disturbances and acts of disobedience because of 
the inordinate inconvenience entailed by the statutory procedure for the judge and 
the referee. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 920 Advisory Committee's Note (1982) (repealed 1983); see also In re Fidelity Mortg. 
Inv'rs, 550 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1976) (chronicling how Rule 920 was premised on the statutory authority 
of§ 41(a) of the 1898 Act); Barbara D. Gilmore, Contempt and Sanction Powers of the Bankruptcy Court, 
18 ]. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 6 ART. 1, 2-3 (2009) (providing general overview of contempt under the 
Bankruptcy Rules of 1973 ). 
166Pub. L. No. 95·598, § 213, 92 Stat. 2549, 2661 (1978). 
16728 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) (repealed 1984). Some have stated that connection between § 105 and 
the All Writs Act is "empty" and perhaps "redundant." Nickles & Epstein, supra note 148, at 15 (noting 
that, in terms of "supplemental law, ... [§] 105 is largely, even completely, redundant"); Levitin, supra 
note 91, at 31-35. 
16828 U.S.C. § 1481 (1978). 
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these newly empowered courts as well-shackles that did not fetter the dis-
trict courts. Namely, § 1481 provided that "[a] bankruptcy court ... may 
not enjoin another court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the 
presence of the judge of the court or warrant[ ] a punishment of imprison-
ment."169 Thus, the constitution of the 1978 bankruptcy courts expressly 
recognized considerable, but not unfettered, contempt authority for bank-
ruptcy judges. 
Third, § 105 was added, capturing the "'necessary and appropriate" 
power that traced its way from the All Writs Act's progenitors to § 2( 15) of 
the 1898 ActP0 Recall that § 2(15) of the 1898 Act granted bankruptcy 
judges the power to "make such orders, issue such process, and enter such 
judgments in addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary 
for the enforcement of the provisions of the Act."'171 Section 105(a)'s broad 
grant of discretion, mirroring this language, thus overlapped right out of the 
gates with § 1481 as a basis for contempt authority. This intrinsic redun-
dancy may thus have served as a secondary grant of statutory authority for 
contempt. But we will never know because before any sort of meaningful 
analysis could be conducted on the interpretative scope of § 105 in the light 
of § 1481, the scheme was struck down.l72 Indeed, right from the get-go, 
§ 105(a) was already "'doubly redundant"' to some extent, because the All 
Writs Act itself already applied to ban~ruptcy courts,m thus making§ 105(a) 
and its predecessor § 2(15) of the 1898 Act awash with gratuity. In fact, 
legislative history concedes that"§ 105 is similar in effect to the All Writs 
Statute." The section is repeated here for the sake of continuity from current 
law and ease of reference, and to cover any powers traditionally exercised by a 
ban~ruptcy court that are not encompassed by the All Writs Statute."'174 Such 
language reveals that perhaps § 105 was indeed formulated as a catch-all pro-
vision or "Super All Writs Act."'175 It also importantly recognizes that the 
historical power of bankruptcy commissioners carried into early U.S. bank-
169Id. § 24l(a), 92 Stat. at 2671 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1481). 
170See Levitin, supra note 91, at 30-31. 
171Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 2, 30 Stat. 544, 546 (as amended) (repealed 1979). 
172See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon, 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
173Seeln re Int'l Power Sec. Corp., 170 F.2d 399, 402 (3d Cir. 1948); In re Kristan, 395 B.R. 500, 511 
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2008). 
174H.R. REP. No. 95·595, at 316-17 (1977) (emphasis added), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6273-74; see also Bogart, supra note 153, at 830 n.l21 (detailing the intersection of§ 105 and the All 
Writs Act). 
1750ne query is whether such open-ended statutory drafting was as an implicit recognition by the 
legislature that bankruptcy courts operate in equity and, therefore, require greater flexibility. See supra 
note 91 (considering debate over whether bankruptcy courts are "courts of equity"); cf. Levitin, supra note 
91 (arguing that they are not courts of equity but do have broad discretion in crafting federal common law 
of bankruptcy). 
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ruptcy practice came with all sorts of equitable authority that "regular" 
courts may not have used, even under the All Writs Act. 
This begs the question of what the All Writs Act already did for the 
bankruptcy court and if§ 105 was, in fact, redundantP6 The All Writs Act 
was originally enacted in the Judiciary Act of 1789.177 It has been character-
ized as a "necessary" statute "because federal courts maintain limited jurisdic-
tion and hav[e] only those powers expressly granted by Congress." 178 Thus, 
the All Writs Act provides the necessary procedural tools, specifically the 
"various historic common-law writs," that federal courts use to "exercise their 
limited jurisdiction."179 Our point here is not to parse the All Writs Act to 
see if it confers additional authority on bankruptcy courts (or if§ 105 confers 
additional authority not captured by the All Writs Act, which its legislative 
history suggests it seeks to do). Rather, our point is simply to lay down a 
marker that the All Writs Act itself might be a basis for the statutory grant 
of criminal contempt authority. To be sure, the reader may well ask, if the 
All Writs Act, kicking around in some form since 1787, grounds the statu-
tory conferral of contempt power to federal courts, what work does the gen-
eral federal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. § 401, do? An answer might stem 
from 18 U.S.C. § 401: it only applies to "courts of the United States," which 
bankruptcy courts were in 1978 but quite plausibly no longer are, since 1984. 
Thus, the All Writs Act may give non-courts of the United States-but 
courts that are nonetheless "created by act of Congress," assuming that is a 
different standard-a statutory basis for contempt. 
Yet that answer only half-satisfies. Surely the purpose of the All Writs 
Act is not simply to apply to the sliver of courts, which perhaps includes the 
bankruptcy courts, which are not "courts of the United States" but are 
"courts created by act of Congress"? If so, then perhaps the true relevance of 
18 U.S.C. § 401 is not as an enabling statute, but as a restrictive statute.180 
That is, Congress' enactment of the law was partially gratuitous, because 
courts can to some extent impose their own contempt sanctions under their 
inherent power and/or the All Writs Act. Rather, the contempt statute is 
principally relevant for adding the constraints on the contempt remedy 
which, as discussed above, the Supreme Court thinks is within Congress' 
176See Bogart, supra note 153; see also Ralph Brubaker, N.ondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 
11: Revisiting jurisdictional Precepts and the Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 15 
(1998) ("[Section 105], like its predecessor under the 1898 Act, gives to federal bankruptcy courts the 
powers of courts of equity granted to all federal courts in the All Writs Act."). 
' 77Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
178United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 187 (1977) (Stevens,]., dissenting). 
179Id. 
18°Cf In re Bradley, 588 F.3d 254, 265 (5th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that "[ w ]bile the criminal con-
tempt power is limited by 18 U.S.C. [§] 401, civil contempt remains a creature of inherent power"). 
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rights-at least to some degree. 1B 1 
Whatever the proper construction of the All Writs Act, the federal con· 
tempt statute, and the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, it is evident that Congress 
intended bankruptcy courts to exercise both civil and criminal contempt 
power through its statutory innovations of§§ 451, 1481, and 105.182 This 
structure, however, was short-lived. 
D. 11 U.S.C. § 105 Post·BAF]A (And More Related Contempt 
Rules) 
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Northern Pipeline Construction Co. 
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co, finding that the 1978 jurisdictional grant to bank· 
ruptcy courts violated Article III. 183 The plurality opinion first held that the 
new courts did not qualify as Article I "legislative" courts,184 rejecting the 
rationale that Congress' power in establishing "uniform Laws on the subject 
of Bankruptcies throughout the United States" saved the regime. 185 More 
specifically, the Justices stated that such an interpretation would allow Con· 
gress to "create courts free of Art[icle] III's requirements whenever it finds 
that course expedient."186 The opinion also resisted the suggestion that, as 
situated under § 14 71 of Title 28, bankruptcy courts were simply "adjuncts" 
of the district courts like that of administrative agencies and magistrates. 187 
The Northern Pipeline decision's effective date was initially stayed to 
provide Congress with time to cure the constitutional defect, but Congress 
failed to meet the deadline. The Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts drafted an "Emergency Rule,"188 which reinstated-and expanded-
former Rule 920 regarding bankruptcy court criminal contempt power. Like 
Rule 920, it expressly provided that bankruptcy judges could impose criminal 
contempt sanctions for direct contempt but that they lacked the power to 
punish indirect criminal contempt or warrant imprisonment. Interestingly, 
181See supra text accompanying notes 115-23. 
182See Bartell, supra note 95, at 6-7 (summarizing three reasons Congress intended to confer bank· 
ruptcy courts with contempt power in the 1978 Code: (i) bankruptcy courts were created as "adjuncts" of 
the district courts, meaning they possessed inherent power; (ii) they were deemed "courts of the United 
States," meaning they possessed statutory contempt power; and (iii) Congress explicitly granted bank· 
ruptcy courts the "powers of a court of equity, law and admiralty"). 
183458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (plurality opinion); id. at 91-92 (Rehnquist,]., concurring). 
184/d. at 63 (plurality opinion). 
185/d. at 72 (quoting U.S. CoNST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4). 
186/d. at 73. 
187/d. at 76-89. The Court did recognize Congress' "broad discretion to assign factfinding functions to 
an adjunct created to aid in the adjudication of congressionally created statutory rights"; however, the 
Court found that Congress lacks this discretion when it concerns "rights not created by it." Bartell, supra 
note 95, at 8. 
188For the full text of the Emergency Rule, see White Motor Corp. v. Citiban~, N.A., 704 F.2d 254, 
265-67 (6th Cir. 1983). See also Orem, supra note 158, at 227 n.32 (describing the Emergency Rule). 
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the Emergency Rule's direct contempt sanctions had no cap, in contrast to 
the $250 cap under prior Rule 920.189 
Congress eventually enacted the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA").190 BAFJA returned bankruptcy judges to 
subservience to district judges, only hearing such matters that the Article III 
judges might choose to refer. 191 Bankruptcy judges could "hear and deter-
mine" all "core proceedings" arising under Title 11 or arising in cases under 
Title 11.192 Regarding possible bases for contempt, BAFJA also amended 
§ 451 to exclude bankruptcy courts from the category of "courts of the 
United States," and thus withdrew the access to statutory contempt power 
under 18 U.S.C. § 401. This was coupled with the somewhat elusive repeal 
of § 1481.193 As outlined above, ill-fated § 1481, with some restrictions, 
granted bankruptcy courts "the powers of a court of equity, law, and admi-
ralty."194 Section 1481 was initially slated in the 1978 Code to take effect on 
April1, 1984.195 Congress passed a series of legislative postponements push-
ing back this date in trying to fix the constitutional infirmities during the 
stopgap period of the Emergency RuleJ96 The final rendering of§ 1481 be-
came effective on June 28, 1984, pursuant to these legislative pushbacks.197 
Twelve days later, however, on July 10, 1984, BAFJA went into effect.198 
BAFJA's haphazard statutory drafting resulted in uncertainty regarding 
whether § 1481 was repealed barely a fortnight after its enactment. The 
confusion arose from two inconsistent provisions in the new law: on the one 
hand, BAFJA § 121(a) provided that § 1481, effective as of June 28, 1984, 
would cease to be effective until BAFJA's enactment, thus envisioning yet 
another postponement, but ultimate effectiveness, of§ 1481;199 on the other 
189Emergency Rule (d)(1)(B)(i)-(ii) (limiting the bankruptcy court's indirect contempt power but lift-
ing a monetary cap on direct contempt findings); FED. R. BANKR. P. 920(a)(3) (detailing a monetary cap on 
direct contempt findings that was in force prior to the Emergency Rule). 
190Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
19128 U.S.C. § 157(a). 
19228 U.S.C. § 157(b). 
193Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). Some courts have considered § 1481 still in force. See 
infra note 201 
19428 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982) (repealed 1984) (highlighting that§ 1481 is "the concomitant of the bank-
ruptcy court[']s increased jurisdiction, and is necessary to enable the bankruptcy court to exercise that 
jurisdiction and its powers under the bankruptcy code. It is in addition to any power granted under 28 
U.S.C. [§] 1651 (the All Writs Statute) or under section 105."). 
195Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682, § 402(b). 
196See Pub. L. No. 98-249, 98 Stat. 116 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-271, 98 Stat. 163 (1984); Pub. L. No. 
98-299, 98 Stat. 214 (1984); Pub. L. No. 98-325, 98 Stat. 268 (1984). 
197See Pub. L. No. 98-325, 98 Stat. 268 (1984). 
198Pub. L. No. 98-353; 98 Stat. 333 (1984). 
199Id. § 121(a) (providing§ 121(a) was "amended in subsections (b) and (e) by striking out 'June 28, 
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hand, BAFJA § 113 provided that § 1481 ~shall not be effective."200 There 
is understandable confusion concerning § 1481's status,201 because it was ei-
ther made finally effective or it was outright repealed upon BAFJA's 
enactment. 
Notwithstanding some courts' invocation of§ 1481 as still-good law, the 
consensus seems to be that it was repealed.202 As Professor Levitin explains, 
the common notion is that BAFJA § 121(a) existed "to postpone the effec-
tive date of[§] 1481 ... to take care of the hiatus which then existed be-
tween June 28th and July 10th."203 Section 121(a)'s sole purpose might thus 
have been ~to postpone the effective date until [§] 1481 became ineffective 
by virtue of [§] 113."204 Complicating the matter is the lack of legislative 
history specifically addressing§ 1481's (likely) repeal. Nonetheless, it is plau-
sible to believe that if Congress did in fact intend to repeal § 1481, it was 
because such an expansive jurisdictional grant contravened N..orthern Pipe-
line's holding.205 But, as Levitin also notes, if that was its intent, it seems odd 
that Congress would continue with a trend of postponements, rather than 
repealing § 1481 from the outset.206 This mess is relevant to the present 
discussion because if bankruptcy courts have all powers of law and equity, 
they would necessarily have the contempt power, both inherent and pursu-
ant to statute under the federal contempt law. In sum, if§ 1481 is still good 
law, the search for a statutory basis for bankruptcy court contempt power 
ends. 
As for § 105 itself, BAFJA did not leave it entirely unchanged, as clause 
1984' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof 'the date of enactment of the Bankruptcy Amend· 
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984'"). 
200
Id. § 113 (providing § 113 was "amended by striking out 'shall take effect on June 28, 1984' and 
inserting in lieu thereof 'shall not be effective'"). 
201 For example, courts have invoked§ 1481 as a source of bankruptcy court contempt power in cases 
as recent as 1996 and 1999. See In re Muncie, 240 B.R. 725, 727 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999) ("This Court 
has statutory power under 28 U.S.C. § 1481, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 9020 to enter a 
finding of civil contempt and to award actual damages for violations of the automatic stay ... ."); In re 
Elder·Beerman Stores Corp., 197 B.R. 629, 632 (Bankr. D. Ohio, 1996) (discussing the bankruptcy court's 
contempt power "recognized in 28 U.S.C. § 1481"). These courts at least were backed up by the then· 
printed U.S. Code; in the 2000 printing of the Code, however,§ 1481 was quietly removed. See Levitin, 
supra note 91, at 27-30 (discussing statutory revisions). 
202S~inner, 917 F.2d at 449 n.6 (lOth Cir. 1990); In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380, 390 (lOth Cir. 
1990) (recognizing that, in response to the N,orthern Pipeline decision, § 1481 was repealed); In re Hipp, 
Inc., 895 F.2d 1503, 1516-17 (5th Cir. 1990); cf. In re Haddad, 68 B.R. 944,948 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) 
(concluding that in matters of direct contempt where imprisonment is not warranted "bankruptcy courts 
may properly exercise criminal contempt powers to the same extent that Congress intended they have 
them under § 1481 "). 
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(a) was amended to read "'court" instead of "'bankruptcy court,"207 and clause 
(c) was added to clarify that§ 105 does not provide bankruptcy courts with 
any form of independent jurisdiction beyond that outlined in Title 28.208 But 
we don't think these changes affect the bottom line: the consensus is that 
BAFJA repealed short-lived § 1481, leaving the bankruptcy courts, arguably 
no longer "courts of the United States," with lonely § 105 as the sole statu-
tory fount for the contempt power.209 
This consensus allows curiously opposed conclusions. The first is that 
because all the contempt power conferred on bankruptcy courts was housed 
in repealed §§ 451 and 1481 back when § 105 was first added to the 1978 
Code, § 105 was never designed or intended to grant a power to impose 
contempt sanctions. Several scholars take this view.210 The second interpre-
tation, however, which even these skeptics admit is equally textually possi-
ble,211 is that the flexible language of§ 105 is perfectly sufficient to house a 
contempt power, and this belt was never needed before the suspenders of 
§§ 451 and 1481 were repealed. In other words, possible redundancy in 1978 
was remedied by repeal in 1984 of the redundancy-inducing provisions. In-
deed, recall that redundancy was immanent in the Code already with§ 105's 
intentional overlap with the All Writs Act. A scale-tipper in preferring one 
of these two diametric interpretations might be the consequences of the first 
interpretation's stripping bankruptcy courts of any statutory basis for the 
contempt power, which might well violate the Supreme Court's pre-Code 
practices doctrine, especially given the long pedigree of contempt-like 
207ll U.S.C. § 105(a). 
208ll U.S.C. § 105(c) provides: 
The ability of any district judge or other officer or employee of a district court to 
exercise any of the authority or responsibilities conferred upon the court under this 
title shall be determined by reference to the provisions relating to such judge, of-
ficer, or employee set forth in title 28. This subsection shall not be interpreted to 
exclude bankruptcy judges and other officers or employees appointed pursuant to 
chapter 6 of title 28 from its operation. 
Section 105(a) also had a third sentence added in 1986 that provided: 
No provision of this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest 
shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or 
making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court 
orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process. 
Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 203, 100 Stat. 3088, 3097 (1986) (codified at ll U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994)). 
209See In re Haddad, 68 B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) ("Until the 1986 Amendments ... 
courts seeking to divine the contempt powers of bankruptcy judges had as their only source [section] 
105(a) ... . ");see also Bartell, supra note 95, at 15 (noting the significance of the amendments to§§ 1481 
and 451, which served as the most obvious statutory bases for bankruptcy court contempt powers). 
210Id. at 33-34. 
211See id. at 31-34. 
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sanctions.212 
Post-BAFJA, the Rules continued to develop on the apparent assumption 
there was indeed contempt authority. Of course, we do not know whether 
the revisions occurred pursuant to the second interpretation of § 105 set out 
above (as a statutory basis for contempt power) or pursuant to a belief that 
the inherent power of the bankruptcy courts required no such authorization, 
so long as the contempt power was limited to certain types of egregious 
conduct (say, direct contempt). Whatever the thinking, shortly after BAFJA 
was enacted, in 1986, the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules promul-
gated several amendments. Most notable for present purposes were the 1987 
revisions to Bankruptcy Rule 9020 (as former Rule 920 had come to be 
numbered).213 
Perhaps chastened by Northern Pipeline's smack-down of bankruptcy 
212See, e.g., Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 517 (2010) ("[T]he Court will not read the Bank· 
ruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a 
departure.") (internal quotation marks omitted). And as Professor Schwartz reminds, the goal in 1978, as 
ratcheted back in 1984, was to give bankruptcy judges more, not less power, than they had under prior 
practice. 
Congress in 1978 wanted to elevate the stature of the bankruptcy courts rather 
than reduce it. This goal produced the replacement of the bankruptcy referee sys-
tem with 'real judges' who are appointed for substantial terms and paid high sala-
ries. To grant these new judges less authority to make policy than the referees they 
replaced would have been irrational. 
Alan Schwartz, The N_ew Textualism and the Rule of Law Subtext in the Supreme Court's Ban~ruptcy 
jurisprudence, 45 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 149, 186 (2001); see also supra Part II (discussing historical practice 
of bankruptcy commissioners). 
213Rule 920 was renumbered in 1983 and largely tracked the Emergency Rule's treatment of bank-
ruptcy court contempt. 
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEDURES: 
(a) Procedure 
(1) Summary Disposition. Criminal contempt which may be punished by a bank-
ruptcy judge acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1481 may be punished summarily by a 
bankruptcy judge if he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and if it 
was committed in his actual presence. The order of contempt shall recite the facts 
and shall be signed by the judge and entered of record. 
(2) Disposition After a Hearing. Criminal contempt which may be punished by a 
bankruptcy judge acting pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1481, except when determined as 
provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision, may be punished by the bankruptcy 
judge only after a hearing on notice. The notice shall be in writing, shall state the 
essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe the con-
tempt as criminal and shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable 
time for the preparation of the defense. The notice may be given on the court's 
own initiative or on application of the United States attorney or by an attorney 
appointed by the court for that purpose. If the contempt charged involves disre-
spect or criticism of a bankruptcy judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at 
the hearing except with the consent of the person charged. 
(3) Certification to District Court. If it appears to a bankruptcy judge that criminal 
contempt has occurred, but the court is without power under 28 U.S.C. § 1481, to 
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judges, an early draft of revised Rule 9020 proposed to make the district 
court the sole forum for hearing and determining all contempt motions, limit-
ing bankruptcy judges to certifying facts.214 The committee did not approve 
such a turning back of the bankruptcy court clock, but it did take away the 
power of the bankruptcy court to enter final judgments of contempt, a power 
that existed under former Rule 920 and then-effective Rule 9020.215 The 
1987 amendment allowed bankruptcy judges only to enter what might be 
considered "presumptive" judgments, subject to de novo review in district 
court upon timely party objection.216 In relevant part, revised Rule 9020 
punish or to impose the appropriate punishment for the criminal contempt the 
judge may certify the facts to the district court. 
(b) Right to Jury Trial. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to impair the right 
to jury trial whenever it otherwise exists. 
FED. R. BANK. P. 9020 (1983) (amended 1987, 1991, 2001). 
214See In re L.H. & A. Realty, Inc., 62 B.R. 910,914 n.4 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1986) (noting the proposal and 
controversy surrounding contempt power). 
215FED. R. BANK. P. 9020 (1983) (amended 1987, 1991, 2001). While the Advisory Committee might 
have stated in their notes that "bankruptcy judges may ... not have the power to punish for contempt[,]" 
this does not appear to have dissuaded them in forming Rule 9020. Letter from Morey L. Sear, on behalf 
of Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, to Edward T. Gignoux, Chairman of the Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States (June 13, 1986), in Preface 
to 1995·2 COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION BANKRUPTCY RULES at lxxxvii·lxxxviii (Lawrence P. 
King et a!. eds.). 
21
6 Contempt Proceedings 
(a) Contempt Committed in Presence of Bankruptcy Judge. Contempt committed 
in the presence of a bankruptcy judge may be determined summarily by a bank· 
ruptcy judge. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be signed by 
the bankruptcy judge and entered of record. 
(b) Other Contempt. Contempt committed in a case or proceeding pending before 
a bankruptcy judge, except when determined as provided in subdivision (a) of this 
rule, may be determined by the bankruptcy judge only after a hearing on notice. 
The notice shall be in writing, shall state the essential facts constituting the con· 
tempt charged and describe the contempt as criminal or civil and shall state the 
time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the preparation of the 
defense. The notice may be given on the court's own initiative or on application of 
the United States attorney or by an attorney appointed by the court for that pur· 
pose. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or criticism of a bankruptcy 
judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the hearing except with the con· 
sent of the person charged. 
(c) Service and Effective Date of Order; Review. The clerk shall serve forthwith a 
copy of the order of contempt on the entity named therein. The order shall be 
effective 10 days after service of the order and shall have the same force and effect 
as an order of contempt entered by the district court unless, within the 10 day 
period, the entity named therein serves and files objections prepared in the manner 
provided in Rule 9033(b). If timely objections are filed, the order shall be reviewed 
as provided in Rule 9033. 
(d) Right to Jury Trial. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to impair the right 
to jury trial whenever it otherwise exists. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020 (1987) (amended 1991, 2001). 
The 1987 version of Rule 9020(a) tweaked that bankruptcy judges could "determine" contempt, unlike the 
2017) CRIMINAL CONTEMPT IN BANKRUPTCY COURTS 347 
provided: 
The [contempt] order shall be effective 10 days after service of the order 
and shall have the same force and effect as an order of contempt entered by 
the district court unless, within the 10 day period, the entity named therein 
serves and files objections prepared in the manner provided in Rule 
9033(b).217 
The 1987 amendments and their "presumptive judgment" approach thus 
appear to have staked out a middle ground between the ability to enter a 
final order on the one hand and complete reliance on district courts under the 
certification regime (as had been briefly proposed) on the other. But there is 
no denying that they rolled back the authority of bankruptcy courts to im-
pose criminal contempt.21s 
Finally, by 2001, the rule makers threw in the towel and repealed Rule 
9020 altogether, simply saying that contempt matters henceforth were to be 
governed by Rule 9014's motion practice, sidestepping what constraints, if 
any, circumscribe the bankruptcy courts' contempt power.21 9 Advisory 
Committee Notes reveal that this change was made because "[i]ssues relating 
to the contempt power of bankruptcy judges are substantive and are left to 
statutory and judicial development, rather than procedural rules.~220 The 
plain language of Bankruptcy Rules 9020 and 9014 now permit parties to 
seek orders of civil contempt by motion, but it does not speak directly to 
1983 version, which provided that bankruptcy judges could "punish" contempt, a distinction that may 
have intended either to effect a substantive change or merely to unify a standard for civil and criminal 
contempt. FED. R. BANK. P. 9020 (1983) (amended 1991, 2001). Few courts have probed this issue. For 
one example, consider In re Kennedy, 80 B.R. 673 (Bankr. D. Del. 1987) (noting possibly peculiar construe· 
tion of Rule 9020, under which, if intending to suggest the power to "determine" does not include the 
power to "punish," a contemnor could simply fail to raise an objection to a "determined" order and thereby 
prevent its enforcement given the bankruptcy court's lack of power to "punish"). A more likely reading of 
revised Rule 9020 is found in Miller v. Mayer, which held that the ability to "determine" is inclusive of the 
ability to "punish." 81 B.R. 669, 678 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988). 
217FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020(c) (1987) (amended 1991, 2001). 
218For some, even the 1987 version of Rule 9020 ran into constitutional problems. Consider the court 
in Hipp, which found that the Rule did not authorize bankruptcy courts to make a first-stage determina· 
tion and enter a presumptive order, even for direct contempt; rather, district court involvement was 
deemed required. See Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1521. The Fifth Circuit paid close attention to the principle 
discussed in United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), of"the one who decides must hear," and the 
principle from Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989), which provides that "absent waiver by the 
defendant, the conduct of all critical stages of criminal trials ... must be before the judicial officer having 
jurisdiction to render the judgment of acquittal or conviction and sentence." Because Rule 9020 allowed 
the bankruptcy judge to enter a presumptive order of contempt, subject to a ten-day objection period, the 
district court's "review" might result in an order of contempt being decided by a district court that did not 
itself hear the evidence against the contemnor. In the Hipp court's judgment, this violated these two 
guiding principles. 
219-Rule 9014 governs a motion for an order of contempt made by the United States trustee or a party 
of interest." FED. R. BANK. P. 9020. 
22°FED. R. BANK. P. 9020 Advisory Committee Note (2001), 6B Bankr. Service L. Ed. § 59:693. 
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criminal contempt, which presumably originates by court action, sua sponte, 
rather than party motion.221 It is unclear whether this silence regarding 
criminal contempt in current Rule 9020 was intended to strip criminal con-
tempt authority from bankruptcy judges or simply to kick matters back to a 
literally unruly state of nature where bankruptcy courts have no guidance on 
the exercise of the criminal contempt power that is conferred by inherent 
authority, § 105, or both.222 
The evolution (and devolution) of the Rules sheds limited light on the 
proper interpretation of § 105. On the one hand, it would seem that the 
Rules proceeded on the assumption that there was a contempt authority else-
where conferred in need of regulation by rule, which implies § 105 would 
indeed be the requisite statutory hook after the repeal of§§ 451 and 1481. 
On the other hand, it is conceivable that the 2001 amendments were a con-
fession of error intended to express a belief that no such authority was ever 
conferred by § 105 in the first place. If the latter is the case, then we revert 
to the pre-existing statutory interpretation question: if § 105 was not in-
tended to confer a contempt power in 1978--because other, more explicit 
statutory provisions were so doing--is its interpretation fixed? Or could 
language that meant one thing in 1978, and that would have to confront such 
canons of statutory interpretation as the aversion of surplusage, mean another 
thing in 1984, when seemingly broad language would nothave to be tamped 
down to avoid redundancy concerns?223 Even critics of reading § 105 expan-
sively admit such an argument is textually plausible,224 and so it may be ap-
propriate to return to first principles. Namely, given (1) that bankruptcy 
courts exercised at least some types of contempt powers in the past, (2) that 
§ 105's legislative intent was to serve as a catch-all to pick up additional 
powers missed by the All Writs Act, and (3) that courts are loath to infer a 
redesign of pre-Code practice in the absence of some clear congressional indi-
cation (with generic N.orthern Pipeline hysteria not cutting it), should one 
not have pause? Namely, should one not be skeptical that § 105's wide-
221 [May] an action for criminal contempt in a congressionally created court ... consti-
tutionally be brought in the name and pursuant to the power of a private person, 
rather than in the name and pursuant to the power of the United States[?] The 
answer to that question is no. The terrifying force of the criminal justice system 
may only be brought to bear against an individual by society as a whole, through a 
prosecution brought on behalf of the government. 
Robertson v. U.S. ex rel. Watson, 560 U.S. 272, 273 (2010) (Roberts, C.]., dissenting) (internal quotation 
omitted); see also Note, Permitting Private Initiation of Criminal Contempt Proceedings, 124 HARV. L. 
REv. 1485 (2011) (arguing that initiation of criminal contempt proceedings by private individuals does not 
violate the due process right to disinterested public prosecution). 
222Certainly no suggestion has been made that bankruptcy courts require enabling rules to exercise 
criminal contempt authority. 
223See, e.g., Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2034, 2043 (2012). 
224See Bartell, supra note 95, at 33-34. 
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sweeping text--that confers authority to do anything "necessary and appro-
priate" to carry out the provisions of Title 11--somehow fails to authorize 
the power, when necessary and appropriate, to order criminal contempt sanc-
tions? We think so. 
E. ·IMPLIED RESTRICTIONS ON 11 U.S.C. § 105 
Thus far we have tried to interpret § 105 on its own to discern if it is a 
solid statutory foundation for criminal contempt, and we have come to the 
initial conclusion that it is. Yet the statutory conversation cannot end there, 
for as we all know the statute must not be interpreted in isolation. A neces-
sary further inquiry is whether other statutory provisions counsel clawing 
back this presumptively broad reading of § 105 as it regards the contempt 
power. There are smatterings of statutory arguments making exactly such a 
claim, but we ultimately believe none of them can carry much weight. None-
theless, in an abundance of lawyerly caution, we address them here. 
First, internal to the Bankruptcy Code, other provisions, for example, 
§§ 303225 and 363,226 explicitly authorize the award of punitive sanctions, 
which are at least analogous to criminal contempt, and so if Congress did not 
say more about punitive sanctions in the Code, courts should be hesitant to 
expand punitive powers through§ 105 beyond these domains.227 This argu-
ment is flawed because both sections address harms directly inflicted upon 
debtors: § 303 deals with a false accusation of insolvency and allows punitive 
damages against bad-faith transgressors, almost like damages for libel, which 
are paid directly to the solvent "debtor." Similarly, § 362 addresses individ-
ual debtors whose creditors knowingly violate the automatic stay, perhaps 
seizing essential personal property. There, again, the harm is inflicted quite 
poignantly upon the aggrieved debtor. By contrast, criminal contempt is an 
infraction against the court;228 indeed, the awards presumptively do not get 
paid to the debtor but to the State or a deserving non-profit.229 As such, it is 
difficult to glean anything at all from §§ 303 and 362 regarding criminal con-
tempt against "the court." 
Second, internal not just to the Code but to § 105 itself, is the constraint 
225 11 U.S.C. § 303(i). 
22611 U.S.C. § 363(n). 
227See John Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 475 B.R. 585 (ED. Mich. 2012), affd sub nom, In re John 
Richards Homes Bldg. Co., 552 F. App'x 401 (6th Cir. 2013). 
228See Sequoia Auto Brokers, 827 F.2d 1281, 1283 n.l (9th Cir. 1987) ("Criminal contempt is a com· 
pleted act of disobedience; the sentence is punitive to vindicate the authority of the court."). Technically, 
some have noted that the crime is against the court - and the particular court - and not the people. See 
JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT (10th ed. 2013), but we need not dwell 
on that because the relevant point is that the harm is "public." 
229See, e.g., In re Gravel, 556 B.R. 561 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2016) (awarding punitive sanctions under Rule 
3002.l(i) and § 105 to a "non•profit legal services entity"). 
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of requiring "necessity" and "'appropriateness." Some courts have held that 
criminal contempt is not statutorily available to bankruptcy courts because 
resort to such heavy-handed relief is not "'necessary" to effectuate the provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code.230 This argument strikes us as intrinsically 
false, because given something as inherently discretion-laden as the imposition 
of criminal contempt, it seems implausible to pre-determine that there are no 
conceivable sets of facts that would warrant the imposition of criminal con-
tempt (on the theory that civil contempt is quite enough as a matter of law). 
Third, external to the Bankruptcy Code is 28 U.S.C. § 636(e),231 which 
addresses the contempt authority of magistrate judges, who are the most sim-
ilarly situated federal judicial officers to bankruptcy court judges. Indeed, 
BAFJA's legislative history makes clear bankruptcy judges were modeled af-
ter magistrate judges: one legislative sponsor of BAFJA explained that "'[ t ]he 
powers that bankruptcy judges exercise" will be "identical to those exercised 
by magistrates," including the power to "'enter a binding judgment" as long as 
"'the parties consent."232 Post-2000, magistrate judges gained the authority 
to punish direct contempt summarily in a revision to 28 U.S.C. § 636,233 
which some found controversial,234expanding on the previous authority only 
to certify contempt findings to district judges.235 Section 636 is explicit 
about granting magistrate judges the power to find contempt and sits in con-
trast to § 105's general language. Thus, this line of argument goes, when 
230See, e.g., Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1503. 
231 28 U.S.C. § 636(e). 
232 130 Cong. Rec. E 1109-10 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
233Section 636 now provides: 
Summary criminal contempt authority.-
A magistrate judge shall have the power to punish summarily by fine or imprison-
ment, or both, such contempt of the authority of such magistrate judge constituting 
misbehavior of any person in the magistrate judge's presence so as to obstruct the 
administration of justice. The order of contempt shall be issued under the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(2). 
234See Mark S. Ken de, 'The Constitutionality of N.ew Contempt Powe-rs for Fede-ral Magistrate-Judges, 
53 HAsTINGS L.J. 567, 595-96 (2002) (arguing the amendments are unconstitutional); cf. Multidistrict, 
Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 1999 and Fede-ral Courts Improvement Act of 1999: Hearing on 
H.R. 2112 and H.R. 1752 Before the Subcomm. On Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the 
judiciary, 106th Cong. 48 (1999) (statement of Joel B. Rosen, U.S. Mag.]., United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey) ("[The tailored magistrate judge contempt authority was] proposed as a 
clear distinction between magistrate judges and [A]rticle III, a bright line, if you will, since magistrate 
judges already have the authority to impose that penalty for certain misdemeanors."). Magistrates were 
initially forced to certify all matters of contempt under the Federal Magistrates Act ("FMA "). Pub. L. 
No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (1968) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 604,631-639, 1915 (1988), and 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3060, 3401-3402 (1994)); see also Taberer v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 
901-08 (3d Cir. 1992) (discussing the contempt power under the FMA). 
23528 U.S.C. § 636(e) (1994) (amended 2001) (ultimately amended to accord magistrate judges more 
contempt authority after multiple demurred proposed amendments). 
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Congress wants federal judges who lack full Article III protections to issue 
contempt, it thinks hard about it and enacts specifically gradated statutes, 
like § 636 (or short-lived § 1481).236 
The problem we have with this argument is two-fold. First, the fact that 
Congress is persnickety elsewhere provides no basis for the induction of a 
rule of statutory construction. Maybe Congress felt laz;ier with BAFJA; 
there's no crime in that. Moreover, the magistrate judges have no analogue 
to § 105, so we are comparing apples with oranges; Congress may well have 
felt, quite correctly we would argue, that bankruptcy judges did not need 
such a statutory provision to confer a power for criminal contempt, as it was 
already there in § 105. Second, and more importantly, bankruptcy judges, 
while similar, are not identical to magistrate judges, for the very reasons sum-
mariz;ed in the first section of this Article on historical practice. Bankruptcy 
adjudicators have always had near-plenary authority within their cabined do-
main of adjusting debtor-creditor relations, the constitutional "core" referred 
to in Northern Pipeline.237 Accordingly, Congress may have felt a more com-
pelling need to spell out what magistrate judges can do; this does not support 
an implication of hesitance for bankruptcy judges acting within their properly 
defined sphere of bankruptcy.238 
Still another statutory argument that bankruptcy courts are incompetent 
to impose criminal contempt sounds in 28 U.S.C. § 157. Some courts have 
noted that § 157 only confers on bankruptcy courts authority to adjudicate 
2360r the Tax Court's explicit conferral of authority: 
(c) Incidental powers. The Tax Court and each division thereof shall have power 
to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, 
and none other, as-
( 1) misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice; 
(2) misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions; or 
(3) disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or 
command. 
It shall have such assistance in the carrying out of its lawful writ, process, order, 
rule, decree, or command as is available to a court of the United States. The 
United States marshal for any district in which the Tax Court is sitting shall, when 
requested by the chief judge of the Tax Court, attend any session of the Tax Court 
in such district and may otherwise provide, when requested by the chief judge of 
the Tax Court, for the security of the Tax Court, including the personal protection 
of Tax Court judges, court officers, witnesses, and other threatened persons in the 
interests of justice, where criminal intimidation impedes on the functioning of the 
judicial process or any other official proceeding .... 
26 U.S.C. § 7456(c). 
237N.orthem Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion). 
238Pertaining to non-core proceedings, however, we are hesitant to emphasi~e a distinction between 
magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges. The fact that parties can veto bankruptcy judge adjudication, 
just as they may veto magistrate judge adjudication, narrows the gap between the judicial actors in this 
context. 
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"core proceedings,"239 and criminal contempt arguably is not a core proceed-
ing, because it is a standalone criminal prosecution.240 This is a simple statu-
tory misreading: core proceedings are those that arise under the Code or 
"arise in" a case under Title 11.241 The contempt citation arises in the bank-
ruptcy case; its ancillary prosecution, if required, cannot be decoupled from 
its underlying predicate, even if it is captioned and conducted as a separate 
trial. Moreover, whether an ancillary trial is required in the first place stems 
from the dictates of due process considerations, see infra section IV.B, which 
do not always require trial (let alone separate trial). Recall that direct con-
tempt can be traditionally punished summarily and so would never be a "sep-
arate proceeding," let alone a non-core one. 
Finally, there are issues of statutory coherence that might counsel restric-
tively reading § 105. Consider, for example, that the federal contempt stat-
ute and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 42 impose numerous restraints 
on the exercise of contempt authority, such as when the original judge may 
preside over the contempt triaJ.242 This concern strikes us as important. But 
that is a question of restriction, not of empowerment-how narrowly to read 
the contempt power statutorily conferred in § 105 (armed by canons of stat-
utory interpretation, such as the absurdity doctrine,243 which might come 
into play if a bankruptcy judge tried to exercise broader contempt power 
23928 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). 
240See, e.g., Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1518. These courts likely derive inspiration from the Supreme Court's 
decision in Campers, 221 U.S. at 445, and Bray v. United States, for the proposition that contempt is "not 
a part of the original cause." 423 U.S. 73, 75 (1975) (per curiam). In Campers, the Court held that a 
lower court prosecution of criminal contempt by the parties in the underlying cause was improper because 
contempt is a separate proceeding. 221 U.S. at 451-52 ("If this had been a separate and independent 
proceeding at law for criminal contempt, to vindicate the authority of the court, ... it could not, in any 
way, have been affected by any settlement which the parties to the equity cause made in their private 
litigation."). In Bray, the Court interpreted a statutory appellate jurisdiction restriction on cases "arising 
under [the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970] or under regulations or orders issued thereunder" that 
was intended to corral appeals to a special temporary appellate court charged with ensuring uniform 
interpretation of the law. Bray, 423 U.S. at 74. A criminal contempt proceeding, tried in district court, 
arising out of a violation of an order under the statute, did not implicate the need for uniformity by going 
to the special court and hence could find its criminal appeal in the regularly presiding circuit court of 
appeal. I d. at 74-76. In bankruptcy, by contrast, jurisdiction attaches not just to cases "arising under" the 
Code, but to all proceedings "arising in" cases under the Code (and indeed, those "related to" such cases). 
28 U.S.C. § 157. This intentionally broader jurisdictional grant renders reliance on these Supreme Court 
cases, with their boilerplate observations that criminal contempt proceedings are "separate" from their 
underlying causes, of limited utility. 
241 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). 
242See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(3) (providing, in part, "[i]f the criminal contempt involves disrespect 
toward or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the contempt trial or hearing 
unless the defendant consents .. ."). 
243See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ("[I]nterpretations of a 
statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent 
with the legislative purpose are available."). 
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than a district judge)-not to question whether the power exists under that 
section's fairest reading. 
After what we flatter (and condemn) ourselves is an exhaustive review, it 
is evident that-from a statutory standpoint-there is no problem with ac-
cording bankruptcy courts criminal contempt power under§ 105. Therefore, 
any problems arising with the vesting of this power in the bankruptcy courts 
must be due to constitutional concerns, to which this Article next turns. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Since there is no statutory impediment to bankruptcy courts exercising 
criminal contempt power, we turn our attention to whether there are consti-
tutional concerns that nonetheless preclude the exercise of that power. 
Equally, exploration of constitutional concerns might counsel revisiting the 
earlier statutory interpretations through the avoidance doctrine.244 And in-
deed, constitutional arguments have featured prominently in the circuit court 
opinions holding that bankruptcy courts lack criminal contempt power. 24 5 
Accordingly, discussion proceeds to a review of the myriad constitutional 
arguments that have been advanced regarding constraints on bankruptcy 
courts' contempt power. In our view, none of them presents a valid challenge 
to the bankruptcy courts' authority. 
A. ARTICLE III 
The Supreme Court seems to have made its peace with the core exercise 
of bankruptcy judges' power as equivalent to the exercise of that power by 
Article III judges under its tortured public rights doctrine.246 While the 
Court has been coy about the issue-never explicitly blessing bankruptcy 
court core authority, e.g., offering only in Northern Pipeline that it "may well 
be" a public right-it seems to have grown weary of the issue.247 Northern 
Pipeline's invalidation of the 1978 bankruptcy court structure started the ball 
244See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005) ("[W]hen deciding which of two plausible 
statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of 
them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail-whether or not those 
constitutional problems pertain to the particular litigant before the Court."). 
245See, e.g., Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1509; John Richards Homes, 552 F. App'x at 401. 
246See, e.g., Wellness Intern. Network, Ltd. v. Sharif 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944-45 (2015); Granfinanciera, 
S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 
(1982) (plurality opinion). The so-called public rights doctrine traces its origins largely back to Murray's 
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855), wherein the Court stated: 
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form 
that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of 
judicial determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cogni-
zance of the courts of the United States, as it may deem proper. 
247]\{orthem Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion); see also Arkison, 134 S. Ct. at 2171 (expres-
sing no reservation of constitutionality of bankruptcy courts presiding over core proceedings). 
354 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 91 
rolling with a negative holding. Rather than say bankruptcy court authority 
over core adjudications was acceptable, the plurality (and concurrence) held 
that private rights adjudication of what we could now call non-core matters 
by judges who lack the full protections of Article III was not acceptable: 
But the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is 
at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distin-
guished from the adjudication of state-created private rights, 
such as the right to recover contract damages that is at issue 
in this case. The former may well be a 'public right,' but the 
latter obviously is not.248 
Private rights, such as matters involving common law liability for breach 
of contract, the plurality concluded, "lie at the core of the historically recog-
nized judicial power" that could not be removed from Article III jurists.249 
Northern Pipeline's plurality failed to attract a majority. Then-Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor were unwilling to shoehorn Article III into 
the tripartite typology of courts-martial, territorial courts, and public rights, 
pushed by Justice Brennan for the plurality,250 and so the contours of Article 
III remained unsettled after the decision.251 This left Congress fumbling for 
the constitutional threshold in designing BAFJA, clinging to the core/non-
core distinction excerpted above. 
Later Article III jurisprudence sidelined Justice Brennan's rigidity of for-
mal categorization of permissible non-Article III exercise of federal judicial 
power. For example, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agr. Products Co., command-
ing a majority, found Justice Brennan sidelined in concurrence, with its disa-
vowal of bright-line distinctions between private rights and public rights: 
"The enduring lesson of Crowell [ v. Benson] is that practical attention to 
substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform 
application of Article 111."252 Functionalism's domination over the Court be-
came complete in the 1986 decision of Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
248N.orthem Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71 (plurality opinion). 
The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and ... to controversies between two 
or more states;-between a state and citizens of another state;-between citizens 
of different states;-between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants 
of different states, and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, 
citizens or subjects. 
U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2. 
249N.orthem Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion). 
250See id. at 63-73 (outlining tripartite framework). 
251See id. at 89-92 (Rehnquist,]., concurring). 
252Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985); see also id. at 595-600 
(Brennan ]., concurring) (contending N.orthem Pipeline plurality opinion test was not as inflexible as some 
feared). 
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sion v. Schor, in which the Court proclaimed: "[T)his Court has rejected any 
attempt to make determinative for Article III purposes the distinction be-
tween public rights and private rights."253 In Schor, the Court held that the 
analysis of whether a non-Article III tribunal may exercise judicial power of 
the United States without running afoul Article III involves consideration of: 
[T]he extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial 
power' are reserved to Article III courts, and, conversely, 
the extent to which the non-Article III forum exercises the 
range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Ar-
ticle III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be 
adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart 
from the requirements of Article IIJ.254 
Holding that the CFTC could adjudicate a common law breach of con-
tract counterclaim when resolving a brokerage fee dispute that was volunta-
rily brought before the CFTC on a matter squarely within its administrative 
grant of authority, the Court clarified that Article III protects both individ-
ual litigant rights and structural rights regarding the separation of powers.255 
While the litigant's consent to proceed before the CFTC vitiated any claim 
of individual right infringement, so too did his consent inform the structural 
analysis, by creating diminished concerns of congressional encroachment.256 
These considerations led the Court to apply its multi-factored balancing and 
find no impermissible attempt by Congress to encroach upon the federal judi-
ciary in giving the CFTC private law counterclaim adjudication power: 
"[T)he magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be termed 
de minimis."257 Justice Brennan, now out in the cold methodologically, 
dissented.258 
Although many thought Schor settled the Article III jurisprudence, at 
least methodologically, the Court's next bankruptcy case, Granfinanciera, 
S.A. v. N.ordberg, raised some new doubts, with the majority reviving N.orth-
ern Pipeline's tripartite categorization in dictum regarding the scope of the 
253Schor, 478 U.S. at 853. 
254/d. at 851. 
255/d. at 854-58. 
256 
Id. at 855. 
In such circumstances, separation of powers concerns are diminished, for it seems 
self-evident that just as Congress may encourage parties to settle a dispute out of 
court or resort to arbitration without impermissible incursions on the separation of 
powers, Congress may make available a quasi-judicial mechanism through which 
willing parties may, at their option, elect to resolve their differences. 
257/d. at 856. 
258/d. at 865-67 (Brennan,]., dissenting). 
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Seventh Amendment.259 In Granfinanciera, with Justice Brennan now 
authoring, the Court held that the scope of the Seventh Amendment right is 
somehow analogous (perhaps coterminous) with the Article III right, which 
in turn the Court characterized as invoking the formalist analysis of the 
Northern Pipeline plurality rejected in Schor.260 Worse from a clarity per-
spective, the Court pointedly remarked in a footnote that while core adjudi-
cation of bankruptcy rights by bankruptcy courts may be consistent with 
Article III, the jury was technically still out: 
We do not suggest that the restructuring of debtor-creditor 
relations is in fact a public right. This thesis has met with 
substantial scholarly criticism ... and we need not and do 
not seek to defend it here. Our point is that even if one 
accepts this thesis, the Seventh Amendment entitles peti-
tioners to a jury trial_26 1 
Nonetheless, as the decades passed, bankruptcy courts and parties settled 
into the core/non-core distinction, mostly shrugging off Granfinanciera as a 
dictum-laden quirk. Indeed, the Court's per curiam announcement the next 
year in Langen~amp v. Culp-finding no Seventh Amendment right to jury 
trial in defending a preferential transfer action when the defendant willingly 
files a claim in the bankruptcy court-seemed to confirm that Granfinanciera 
was the exception.262 Langen~amp's reasoning was that if the parties will-
ingly file claims in bankruptcy court, they cannot complain about lack of jury 
trials in those courts (and, if one accepts the dictum of Granfinanciera equat-
ing the Seventh Amendment rights with Article III rights, the lack of full 
Article III judges).263 
Until Stern. When the Stern bombshell fell a couple decades later, Article 
III jurisprudence seemed upended once again, triggering the most recent wave 
of bankruptcy hysteria. Stern's constitutional analysis turned largely on the 
plurality opinion of Northern Pipeline, and Schor found itself sidelined as an 
259Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 52-55 (1989). 
260Id. at 52-59. Granfinanciera held that the defendant of a fraudulent conveyance claim who did not 
consent to trial in bankruptcy court, filed no claim in the bankruptcy court, and generally wanted nothing 
to do with the bankruptcy system, could not be forced to trial in bankruptcy court without a jury. Id. at 
58-65. This was because the Seventh Amendment afforded it the right to a jury trial based on the fact 
that fraudulent conveyances had been tried in the law courts with juries in pre-1787 England. I d. at 
40-64. Because the Bankruptcy Code (at the time) provided for no juries in bankruptcy court, the system 
was unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 41-50. Congress reacted by passing 28 
U.S.C. § 157(e), allowing bankruptcy court jury trials when the parties (and the presiding district court) 
consent. 
261Id. at 55-56 n.11. 
262498 U.S. 42, 42-45 (1990) (per curiam). 
263Jd. 
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afterthought (to the bewilderment of the dissent).264 Indeed, Stern seemed 
hostile to the perceived danger of flexible functionalism eroding the constitu-
tionally protected lines of Article III, stating: 
No 'public right' exception excuses the failure to comply 
with Article III in doing so, any more than in Northern Pipe-
line. . . . What is plain here is that this case involves the 
most prototypical exercise of judicial power: the entry of a 
final, binding judgment by a court with broad substantive 
jurisdiction, on a common law cause of action, when the ac-
tion neither derives from nor depends upon any agency regu-
latory regime. If such an exercise of judicial power may 
nonetheless be taken from the Article III Judiciary simply by 
deeming it part of some amorphous "public right," then Arti-
cle III would be transformed from the guardian of individual 
liberty and separation of powers we have long recognized 
into mere wishful thinking.265 
Stern's holding, now famous, was that Congress' division of§ 157 into 
core and non-core actions did not properly track the constitutional parame-
ters of core bankruptcy power that modern-day bankruptcy commissioners 
could adjudicate. As a result, some items statutorily listed as core under 
§ 157(b)(2) could not, constituent with Article III, be tried before bank-
ruptcy judges over a party's objection.266 While Stern threw the Article III 
case law into doubt, it also seemed to double down on the relevance of the 
core/non-core distinction in bankruptcy as a constitutional premise. To be 
sure, Stern at first suggested that the bankruptcy court's core permissibility 
had yet to be authoritatively approved by the Court,267 but the opinion's 
focus on distinctions between core/non-core functions seems implicitly to ac-
cept it.268 The Court acknowledged that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2), 
"parties may consent to entry of final judgment by bankruptcy judge[s] in 
non-core case[ s ],"269 and so the idea of bankruptcy judges entering at least 
264564 U.S. at 491-92 (devoting minimal attention to the Schor factors); id. at 510 (Breyer, J., dissent· 
ing) (analyzing Schor factors). 
265/d. at 487, 494-95. 
266/d. at 487, 482-505. 
Id. at 487. 
[T]he Bankruptcy Court in this case exercised the 'judicial Power of the United 
States' in purporting to resolve and enter final judgment on a state common law 
claim .... The judicial powers the courts exercise in cases such as this remain the 
same, and a court exercising such broad powers is no mere adjunct of anyone. 
267/d. at 487, 482-505 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)). 
268See id. at 462, 482-503. 
269/d. at 478-80. 
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some final adjudications in the same manner as full Article III district judges 
was not viewed as intrinsically problematic. Justice Scalia in his separate 
opinion also strongly hinted that historical practice would be a more than 
adequate justification for the adjudicative authority of bankruptcy courts 
over core proceedings.2 7° 
By the time Executive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Ar~ison was decided, the 
unanimous Court seemed now to have taken bankruptcy court authority as 
unremarkable over core-or, more precisely, "constitutionally~ core-pro-
ceedings. Justice Thomas stated for the Court: 
If a matter is core, the statute empowers the bankruptcy 
judge to enter final judgment on the claim, subject to appel-
late review by the district court. If a matter is non-core, and 
the parties have not consented to final adjudication by the 
bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy judge must propose find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. Then, the district court 
must review the proceeding de novo and enter final 
judgment.27 1 
True, this could technically be a mere recitation of the statute, not an 
endorsement of its constitutionality, but significantly, Justice Thomas felt the 
need to add no footnotes or conditional language regarding bankruptcy 
judges' core adjudicative authority that so conspicuously hedged Northern 
Pipeline, Granfinanciera, and Stern itself. 
The final installment of the Stern trilogy, Wellness, however, did more. 
Wellness quashed any suggestion that Stern had lurched into a new direction 
of Article III jurisprudence and instead reaffirmed the vitality of the function-
alist Schor test.2 72 Thus, while many commentators (justifiably) had fretted 
that Stern set to usher in a new regime of formalism to overrule, sub silencio, 
Schor's functionalism,2 73 Wellness confirmed that Schor remained good law, 
270 [I)n my view an Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless 
there is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary. For that reason-
and not because of some intuitive balancing of benefits and harms-! agree that 
Article III judges are not required in the context of territorial courts, courts-mar-
tial, or true 'public rights' cases. . . . Perhaps historical practice permits non-Article 
III judges to process claims against the bankruptcy estate ... ; the subject has not 
been briefed, and so I state no position on the matter. 
I d. at 504-05 (Scalia,]., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
271Ar~ison, 134 S. Ct. at 2172. Justice Thomas' subsequent reference to the Stem language surround-
ing core matters and N.orthem Pipeline's considerations is perhaps a de facto acceptance of bankruptcy 
judges having final adjudicatory authority in core bankruptcy matters. See id. at 2172-74. 
272See id. at 1944-45. 
273See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinksy, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern v. Marshall, 2011 S. CT. REv. 
183, 203-12; Kent L. Richland, Stem v. Marshall: A Dead-End Marathon?, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEv.]. 
393, 412-16 (2012). But cf Ralph Brubaker, 'The Constitutionality of Litigant Consent to N.on-Article III 
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functionalism and all, thus quieting-at least for now-the constitutional 
cacophony. 
Although the constitutional core functioning of bankruptcy courts has 
never been formally processed through the Schor test, the workaday assump-
tion of its constitutionality in Executive Benefits and Wellness comes as close 
as possible to "constitutional estoppel" if not an outright holding regarding its 
acceptability. Contrary argument would be a tough row to hoe, particularly 
in light of Justice Scalia's signal that he might jump ship; in his Stern concur-
rence he suggested historical exceptionalism that would presumably comple-
ment as a gloss any lingering vitality to Northern Pipeline's attempted 
taxonomy.274 Indeed, we further know that the four Justices in Stern's dis-
sent thought that non-consensual bankruptcy court adjudication was un-
problematic (at least over cases in which the litigant files a claim in the 
underlying bankruptcy case): 
[S]chor, (in balancing several factors] requires us to deter-
mine pragmatically whether a congressional delegation of ad-
judicatory authority to a non-Article III judge violates the 
separation-of-powers principles inherent in Article III. . . . 
Insofar as the majority would apply more formal standards, it 
simply disregards recent, controlling precedent .... Apply-
ing Schor's approach here, I conclude that the delegation of 
adjudicatory authority before us is constitutional. A grant 
of authority to a bankruptcy court to adjudicate compulsory 
counterclaims does not violate any constitutional separation-
of-powers principle related to Article IIJ.275 
It is thus difficult to imagine a situation in which the Supreme Court 
could now backtrack and find Article III infirmity in bankruptcy court adju-
dication of core proceedings. 
What does all this constitutional wrangling have to do with contempt 
powers? We think two connections become immediately apparent. First, 
none of the Schor factors speaks to criminal contempt.276 While these factors 
do speak of the "essential attributes of judicial power," there is no suggestion 
in Schor, Wellness, or any of the other opinions that contempt is such an 
attribute. Or perhaps more pointedly in reference to the current state of 
Ban~ruptcy Adjudication, 32 No. 12 BANKR. LAw LETTER 1, 12 (Dec. 2012) (suggesting Stem could be 
subsumed within the Schor framework). 
274See Stem, 564 at 503-05 (Scalia, J., concurring). Note that Justice Scalia-doubtless careful to 
permit a majority-styled his clearly critical opinion a full "concurrence." 
275Id. at 519 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted) ("Considering these factors together, I 
conclude that, as in Schor, 'the magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be termed de 
minimis.' I would similarly find the statute before us constitutional."). 
276See Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. 
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lower court bankruptcy jurisprudence, there is certainly no suggestion that 
the imposition of criminal contempt would be any more essential as an "attri-
bute" of judicial power than civil contempt, with its ability to jail recalcitrant 
litigants, which most if not all lower courts in the bankruptcy context agree 
is constitutionally untroubling.277 And although the Court has never expli-
cated the "essential attributes of judicial power" with even remote precision, 
one could infer that contempt is not one of them. Indeed, Judge Posner has 
pragmatically observed, "[T]here is little practical difference between a pre-
siding judge and a presiding magistrate so far as the contempt power is con-
cerned. Judicial interpretation of Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure has significantly curtailed the power of summary contempt."278 
Regarding the essential attributes of judicial power, he concluded that the 
power to impose contempt "is about as crucial as the [judge's] robe."279 In-
deed, Congress has the authority to find people in contempt,280 and it would 
be strange to think of Congress as exercising an essential attribute of judicial 
power. Rather, it is more likely that essential attributes of judicial power 
involve judging-adjudicating and dispositively resolving disputes involving 
legal rights.281 
The second connection is found in the core/ non-core distinction in bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction. If contempt is conceived as non-core to the bankruptcy 
function, then the bankruptcy court's exercise of that power might be on 
shakier constitutional footing than if it is core. To address this concern, we 
might repair to historical practice to see whether bankruptcy courts entered 
orders of contempt.282 But we might equally consider contempt as appurte-
nant to the underlying proceeding, and hence core for a core proceeding and 
non-core for a non-core proceeding. And even that might be too simplistic an 
analysis, because some contempt, such as direct, might be more linked-dare 
we say, "core"-to the relevant proceeding and presiding judicial officer. 
Consider again that even magistrate judges have authority to remedy direct 
contempt, albeit limited to small fines.283 Regardless, however, of whether 
277See e.g., Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1192 (9th Cir. 2003); S~inner, 917 F.2d at 450 (lOth Cir. 1990); In re 
Walters, 868 F.2d 665, 670 (4th Cir. 1989). 
278Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1049 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner,]., dissent· 
ing) (internal citation omitted). 
279Jd. 
280The Supreme Court has recogni;:ed and reinforced Congress' inherent contempt power throughout 
history. See. e.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
For a detailed discussion of iterations of statutory congressional contempt power and other historical 
nuances, see ToDD GARVEY & AussA M. DoLAN, CoNGREss's CoNTEMPT PoWER AND THE ENFORCE· 
MENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: A SKETCH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2014), https:/ 
I www .fas.org/ sgp/ crs/ misc/RL 3 4114: pdf 
281See Schor, 478 U.S. at 854. 
282 See supra Part II (canvassing historical practice). 
283See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(2)·(3). 
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we consider the contempt power to be core or non-core, there remains an 
inescapable conclusion from the Supreme Court's Article III jurisprudence: it 
nowhere indicates the scope or exercise of the contempt power (criminal or 
civil) as being constitutionally relevant in considering the various challenges 
to bankruptcy judges and other jurists who lack the full protection of Article 
III. 
This seemingly straightforward stance renders all the more mystifying 
repeated lower court invocation of bankruptcy court criminal contempt as 
somehow invoking unspecified "Article III concerns."284 These concerns ap-
pear to come from nowhere other than hysteria-they certainly find no prov-
enance in the pronouncements of the Supreme Court. So what causes them? 
As best we can tell, the contempt power's significance to Article III constitu-
tional doctrine stems from two circuit cases that preceded Schor and 
snowballed through repeated citation. These cases addressed the constitu-
tionality of the consensual adjudication regime of then-magistrates (the issue 
that finally was resolved by the Court in Wellness in the bankruptcy context 
in line with the unanimous direction of the courts of appeals case law on 
magistrate judges).285 In wrestling with then-even-more uncertain jurispru-
dence, the Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that magistrate judges could not 
exercise contempt authority under § 636 of the Judicial Code (as it then 
existed) in upholding § 636(c)'s provision authorizing magistrate judges to 
preside over civil trials and enter final judgments, just as district judges could, 
with party consent. Pacema~er Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, 
Inc., expressly pointed to the fact that magistrate judges, even when presiding 
over these consensual trials, could not impose contempt.286 The Ninth Cir-
cuit spoke of "preserving" the Article III authority for full district judges, 
highlighting that the "[d]istrict courts retain the power to adjudge a party in 
contempt [and that §§] 636(c)(3) and (4) provide for appellate review ... 
The Act imposes no limits on review by the Supreme Court. [Thus,] Article 
III courts retain full authority over questions of law."287 
Two months later, the Seventh Circuit, in Geras v. Lafayette Display 
Fixtures, Inc. echoed Pacema~er's reliance on the reservation of the contempt 
power to the district court as insulating § 636 from Article III attack. It 
stated that "perhaps some clear line of demarcation between the power of an 
Article III judicial officer and a magistrate is required[; s ]uch a line of distinc-
284See, e.g., Bingman, 100 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Sequoia Auto Brokers Ltd., Inc., 827 F.2d 
1281 (9th Cir. 1987). 
285Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1949; see, e.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 
725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane) (holding statute authorizing magistrate judges to preside over 
and enter final judgments in all civil trials upon the consent of the parties constitutional under Article III). 
286725 F.2d 537, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane). 
287Id. at 545. 
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tion may be found in the allocation of the contempt power[.]"'288 These stray 
comments from Pacema~er and Geras seem to anchor the claim that the re-
serving contempt authority to Article III judges is not just a feature of § 636 
but, rather, a requirement that rescues it from constitutional oblivion. 
We think these cases have been sorely overread. The claim that magis-
trate judges' lack of contempt authority has constitutional significance ap-
pears at best to be a case of misguided reverse-engineering. The argument 
seems to be because§ 636 did not give magistrate judges contempt authority, 
their ability to adjudicate civil trials upon consent of the parties did not vio-
late Article III. That conclusion does not flow from any of the articulated 
factors in Schor's pragmatic balancing. In fact, quite the contrary and as con-
firmed by Wellness, Schor counsels that consent is dispositive to the personal 
rights of Article III and, while not dispositive, important to the structural 
analysis.289 Notwithstanding Geras' harping on the contempt power as con-
stitutionally significant (if not decisive), Wellness makes not a peep about the 
contempt power's reservation to district courts having any relevance. Given 
these Supreme silences, it seems that these earlier circuit court cases' refer-
ences to the contempt power were misfires.290 The inability of subsequent 
288Geras, 742 F.2d at 1044 (7th Cir. 1984). Geras presaged Schor's reliance on pragmatics, implicitly 
recognizing that lower·level jurists within the Article III judiciary might be needed to make the system 
work notwithstanding first·best ideals: "In the best of all possible constitutional worlds, there would 
perhaps be no non· Article III judicial officers. Judicial independence and the purity of the constitutional 
grant of judicial power might be best assured by barring the door entirely to those unclothed with the 
constitutional protections." I d. at 1045. Yet this is not the world, and we know it. As Justice Sotomayor 
wrote for the Court, "[I]t is no exaggeration to say that without the distinguished service of (bankruptcy 
and magistrate judges], the work of the federal court system would grind nearly to a halt." Wellness, 135 
S. Ct. at 1939. Geras also provoked a notable dissent from Judge Posner, who, never one to forgo empirics, 
estimated that 0.1% of federal criminal proceedings starting in 1983 were for contempt in dismissing the 
contempt power as irrelevant, adding "there is little practical difference between a presiding [Article III] 
judge and a presiding magistrate so far as the contempt power is concerned." 742 F.2d at 1049. 
289Schor, 478 at 855; see also Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944 ("Allowing Article I adjudicators to decide 
claims submitted to them by consent does not offend the separation of powers so long as Article III courts 
retain supervisory authority over the process."). The Supreme Court's magistrate judge Article III juris· 
prudence is equally consistent. See, e.g., Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 932 (1991) (Stevens,].) 
("Petitioner's consent also eliminates [the] concern that a general authorization should not lightly be read 
to deprive a defendant of any important privilege."). The Court explained: 
We do not face a procedure under which 'Congress [has] delegate[ d] to a non· Art. III judge the authority 
to make final determinations on issues of fact.' . . . . Rather, we confront a procedure under which Con· 
gress has vested in Art. III judges the discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and 
impartial assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control over the assistants' 
activities. 
Id. at 938-39. 
290In an analogous context, when Congress was considering expanding the authority of magistrate 
judges to issue the power to "try and punish contempts," the Department of Justice chimed in that it had 
"serious doubts" about the contempt provision, but without much analysis. Thirty years later, when 
limited contempt power was again proposed in 1997, the DOJ upped the ante by suggesting that "giving 
contempt power to non·Article III judges raises some constitutional concerns." Nonetheless, the DOJ 
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case law to reconcile precedents like Pacema~er and Geras with the supersed-
ing Supreme Court opinion of Schor (and now Wellness) is regrettable and 
perpetuates the misapprehension that the contempt power has Article III 
relevance. As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, we have no indication 
from the Supreme Court that it does-and strong negative inference that it 
does not. 
B. DuE PRocEss 
The inapplicability of Article III concerns to contempt does not end the 
constitutional inquiry. The Supreme Court has equally made clear that there 
are relevant constitutional constraints on the contempt power, regardless of 
the Article III stature of the federal jurist, and the principal ones sound in 
due process.29 1 
The contempt power is uniquely situated in terms of constitutional pro-
tections. Historically there were only the loosest of constraints on the power 
of the English courts to police the litigants before them. Per one characteris· 
tic pronouncement, "'The sole adjudication of contempts, and the punishment 
thereof ... belongs exclusively, and without interfering, to each respective 
Court."292 The Supreme Court in this country has grappled with what sorts 
of due process protections, if any, must be accorded a putative contemnor.293 
While acknowledging that when contempt crosses into the criminal sphere, 
the Constitution requires procedural rights, the Court has been vague on just 
when those rights come into play. Its jurisprudence suggests a continuum 
that varies protection as a function of the severity of the contempt sanction 
to be imposed.294 
One anchor in the due process analysis is the hoary distinction between 
criminal contempt and civil contempt.2 95 For example, in Gompers v. Buc~s 
never challenged the rules, so it is not clear how deep-felt their worries truly were. See Kende, supra note 
2344, at 568-69 (discussing DOJ letters). 
291See, e.g., Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994). Procedural issues concerning due process rights arise 
through numerous constitutional provisions, not just the Due Process Clause, such as the right to counsel 
in the Sixth Amendment, the right to jury in Article III and the Sixth Amendment, and the Re-Examina· 
tion Clause of the Seventh Amendment, coupled with incorporation into state law through the Four· 
teenth Amendment. U.S. Canst. art. III; U.S. Canst. amends. VI, VII, and XIV. 
292Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 38, 44 (1822) (citing Case of Brass Crosby, 95 Eng. Rep. 
1005, 1014) (K.B. 1771)). Althougb short-lived, the Supreme Court's initial practice largely resembled the 
English practice of unfettered power to administer contempt. See, e.g., Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. 38, 
42-44 (1822) (holding that the Court lacked authority to review a lower federal court's contempt order 
because of both common law and statutory restraints). See generally Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Getting Beyond 
the Civil/Criminal Distinction: A N.ew Approach to the Regulation of Indirect Contempts, 79 VA. L. REv. 
1025 (1993) (arguing for a "conceptual simplification of the contempt process" and "some additional proce· 
dural protections to safeguard against the unjustified imposition of severe coercive sanctions"). 
293See, e.g., Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994); Campers, 221 U.S. at 418. 
294See id. at 838-39. 
295See Dudley, supra note 292, at 1035-43. 
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Stove & Range Co, the Court distinguished criminal from civil contempt for 
purposes of determining the rights to be accorded the putative contemnor.296 
In a unanimous opinion, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's contempt con-
viction against Samuel Gompers, the famed labor union leader, and two of his 
associates for violating a preliminary injunction, because he was not accorded 
sufficient due process protections for a finding of criminal contempt.297 The 
Court, while trying to categorize the underlying contempt, noted a persistent 
difficulty: "It may not always be easy to classify a particular act as belonging 
to either one of these two classes. It may partake of the characteristics of 
both."298 Despite this challenge, the Court went on to distinguish the impor-
tance of the underlying nature of the contempt: 
It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and 
purpose, that often serve to distinguish between the two 
classes of cases. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is 
remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is 
for criminal contempt the sentence is punitive, to vindicate 
the authority of the court.299 
The distinction was born, and the "character and purpose" test became 
foundationaP00 The Court also went on to recognize that "punishment by 
imprisonment," which Campers et al. were appealing, could be "remedial as 
well as punitive, and many civil contempt proceedings have resulted not only 
in the imposition of a fine, payable to the complainant, but also in committing 
the defendant to prison."301 Parsing the contempt order in this way was 
important for the Court, even if this sanction could be the same, because if 
the contempt is "merely" civil, it does not trigger the due process protections 
accorded criminal defendants, and so the Court's insistence on nuance in clas-
sification was understandable. 
Eighty-three years later the Court waded into contempt standards again 
in United Mine Wor~ers of America v. Bagwel/.302 The underlying proceed-
ings involved an ugly labor dispute, with an injunction barring "rock throw-
ing, the puncturing of tires, threatening, following or interfering with 
respondents' employees, placing pickets in other than specified locations, and 
roving picketing."303 When the union violated the injunction, contempt fines 
of $64 million amassed. Because the fines were monetary, the Virginia Su-
296221 U.S. 418, 441-43 (1911). 
297Id. at 451-52. 
298Id. at 441 (citation omitted). 
299Id. (emphasis added). 
300See, e.g., Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827-28; Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369 (1966). 
301Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441-42. 
302512 U.S. 821 (1994). 
303Id. at 843. 
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preme Court held they sounded in civil contempt, rather than criminal, in 
part due to its conclusion, following (but distinguishing) Campers, that the 
purpose was remedial in attempting to induce compliance with the court's 
order.304 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the lower court's contempt 
award was criminal, rather than civil, and thus the contemnor had the right 
to a jury triaP05 In doing so, the Court noted that there was no way to 
purge the fines through compliance, because the fines were levied after the 
failure to comply.306 Noteworthy about Bagwell was not just a disagreement 
with the court below and reversal on the civil vs. criminal classification ques-
tion, but also the shift in the Court's analysis, focusing on more functional 
considerations in meting out due process rights for contempt.307 For exam-
ple, the Court highlighted that "indirect contempts involving discrete, readily 
ascertainable acts, such as turning over a key or payment of a judgment prop-
erly may be adjudicated through civil proceedings since the need for exten-
sive, impartial factfinding is less pressing."308 Juxtaposed to these "discrete" 
matters, the Court compared "out-of-court disobedience to complex injunc-
tions[, which] often require elaborate and reliable factfinding." 309 While 
both the opinion and Justice Scalia's concurrence focused on the evolution of 
orders and their correlating complexity, the underlying message was one of 
context rather than dichotomy, i.e., "allowing a relatively unencumbered con-
tempt power when its exercise is most essential, and requiring progressively 
greater procedural protections when other considerations come into play."310 
304/d. at 825-26. 
305/d. at 826-27. The Court rejected the suggestion that fees announced in advance for non·compli· 
ance could be analogized to civil contempt, "declin[ing] to conclude that the mere fact that the sanctions 
were announced in advance rendered them coercive and civil as a matter of constitutional law." I d. at 837. 
306/d. ("The fines are not coercive day fines, or even suspended fines, but are more closely analogous to 
fixed, determinate, retrospective criminal fines which petitioners had no opportunity to purge once 
imposed."). 
307See Philip A. Hostak, International Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell: A Paradigm Shift in 
the Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 81 CoRNELL L. REv. 181 (1995). 
308Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 833. 
309/d. at 833-34. 
310/d. at 832. Justice Scalia's historically focused opinion paid special attention to the complex nature 
of modern court orders in gauging the degree of constitutional protection due the contemnor: 
[The modern decree] differs in almost every relevant characteristic from relief in 
the traditional model of adjudication, not the least in that it is the centerpiece .... 
It provides for a complex, on·going regime of performance rather than a simple, one· 
shot, one·way transfer. Finally, it prolongs and deepens, rather than terminates, the 
court's involvement with the dispute. 
I d. at 842 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia concluded: "It is not that the times, or 
our perceptions of fairness, have changed ... ; but rather that the modern judicial order is in its relevant 
essentials not the same device that in former times could always be enforced by civil contempt." Id. at 
843-44. 
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On the facts of the case, the Court held that "[ u ]nder these circumstances, 
criminal procedural protections such as the rights to counsel and proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt are both necessary and appropriate to protect the 
due process rights of parties and prevent the arbitrary exercise of judicial 
power."311 (The Court did not opine what protections, if any, would be 
necessary for direct contempt, as Bagwell was the culmination of multiple 
indirect contempts.)312 
In addition to gradation in procedural protections based on the underly-
ing offense, procedural protections also appear to vary with the severity of 
sanc!ion when courts invoke their contempt powers. The Bagwell court con-
cluded that multi-million dollar fines against a labor union were "serious" and 
thus triggered the right to a jury triaP 13 Bagwell reiterated that the jury 
trial right was not absolute, however, even if the contempt is labeled "crimi-
nal" in nature, because "imposition only of serious criminal contempt fines 
triggers the right to jury trial."314 Where to draw the "serious" contempt 
fines line is far from clear. In an earlier case, the Court found that a $10,000 
fine did not trigger protections of Article III and the Sixth Amendment, rely-
ing on the then-prevailing statutory definition of"petty offense."315 Nor does 
jail in itself suggest that a sanction is sufficiently serious to trigger the jury 
trial right as a procedural protection in contempt according to the Court, 
consistent with its precedent that jail punishments of less than six months do 
not trigger the Article III and Sixth Amendment rights to jury triaP 16 
311 I d. at 834. 
312Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 837 (recognizing that "[t]he union's sanctionable conduct did not occur in the 
court's presence or otherwise implicate the court's ability to maintain order and adjudicate the proceedings 
before it"). 
313Id. at 837-39. 
314Id. at 837 n.5 (emphasis added) (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210 (1968)). The Ninth 
Circuit has noted the distinction between "serious" and "relatively mild" sanctions but declined to offer a 
precise definition. See Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1193 (9th Cir. 2003); Hanshaw, 244 F. 3d at 1139 n.lO (9th Cir. 
2001). It is unclear whether criminal contempt - or perhaps criminal contempt with "serious" fines -
should be considered a felony. See United States v. Cohn, 586 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2009) 
("[C]riminal contempt is best categorized as a sui generis offense, rather than a felony or misdemeanor."). 
There is some Supreme Court dictum suggesting that Article III concerns may spring back into relevance 
if contempt is considered a felony. See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 871·72 (1989) (interpreting 
the Federal Magistrate Act's reference to magistrate judges' authority to preside over civil and small 
criminal matters forecloses their authority to preside over felony cases absent party consent under the 
open·ended catch-all provision of 28 U .S.C.§ 636(b )(2); referencing constitutional avoidance doctrine). 
315Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975). In reaching its decision, the Court considered 18 
U.S.C. § 1(3) (1982 ed., Supp. V) (repealed 1984), which defined petty offenses as crimes for which a 
penalty "does not exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $5,000 for an 
individual and $10,000 for a person other than an individual, or both." I d. at 4 76-77. Although 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1(3) was repealed, the petty offense distinction is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 19. 
316Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 150 (1969) (finding that "sentences for criminal contempt of 
up to six months may be constitutionally imposed without a jury trial"); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145, 159-60 (1968) (holding same regarding non·contempt crimes). 
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Lower courts, too, provide disparate assessments of seriousness based on 
quantum assessed. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, in In re E.I. DuPont 
De Nemours & Co.-Benlate Litig., had "little trouble concluding that the 
[roughly $7 million] sanctions the district court imposed were overwhelm-
ingly punitive-and thus criminal-in nature,"31 7 whereas the First Circuit 
has found that fines totaling $1 million a month were civil in nature.318 
Thus, there is nothing one could accurately describe as clear law specify-
ing the due process constraints on the contempt power. The most one can 
say is the law makes clear that such constraints exist. Worse, "seriousness" of 
the sanction injects a new variable into the sliding scale of required due pro-
cess protections. The best we can ascertain is that while the criminal! civil 
divide is important, there is an under-specified balancing that goes on that 
analyzes the severity of the punishment to be imposed (and other considera-
tions) in gauging the level of procedural protections required under the Con-
stitution. Indeed, we think some of these due process concerns animate the 
constraints of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42 (set out in the margin), 
which, for example, requires prosecution of a criminal contempt to be con-
ducted by an independent prosecutor, i.e., not the judge him- or herself,319 as 
31799 F.3d 363, 368 (11th Cir. 1996). The court highlighted that there was not a "compensatory 
aspect to the contempt order" and "there was no coercive aspect to the district court's contempt order." 
I d. 
318See AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG, 780 F.3d 420, 425-28 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
535 (2015). The court focused on the corporation's ability to purge the fines with compliance. Id. at 427 
("The fine accumulates over time, incentivizing Defendants to cure the contempt promptly .... Defend· 
ants thus retain the power to end the accruing of the fines and avoid the potential fiscal catastrophe 
invoked in their brief."). In the process of litigation, the contempt fines surpassed $160 million, nearly 
seven times the amount of the original award. Id. at 427. The First Circuit remanded the case and 
instructed "the district court to amend the sanction order so that the fines cease to accrue at some total 
amount." Id. 
319-The court must request that the contempt be prosecuted by an attorney for the government, 
unless the interest of justice requires the appointment of another attorney. If the government declines the 
request, the court must appoint another attorney to prosecute the contempt." FED R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(2); 
see also Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 803 (1987) (establishing the principle 
codified in Rule 42). In full, Rule 42 provides: 
(a) Disposition After Notice. Any person who commits criminal contempt may be 
punished for that contempt after prosecution on notice. 
(1) Notice. The court must give the person notice in open court, in an order to 
show cause, or in an arrest order. The notice must: 
(A) state the time and place of the trial; 
(B) allow the defendant a reasonable time to prepare a defense; and 
(C) state the essential facts constituting the charged criminal contempt and describe 
it as such. 
(2) Appointing a Prosecutor. The court must request that the contempt be prose• 
cuted by an attorney for the government, unless the interest of justice requires the 
appointment of another attorney. If the government declines the request, the court 
must appoint another attorney to prosecute the contempt. 
(3) Trial and Disposition. A person being prosecuted for criminal contempt is enti· 
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seemingly would have occurred in the good old days of English common 
law.320 Rule 42 similarly compels recusal when the criminal contempt in-
volves "disrespect toward or criticism of a judge."321 Although it is far from 
certain the Supreme Court would consider each of these rules constitution-
ally compelled,322 these constraints established by rule surely reflect the due 
process concerns of the "awesome power" of criminal contempt.323 Note, too, 
that Rule 42 reveals an inherent gradation of the procedural protections for 
the contemnor; one where the citing judge is the specific target of the con-
tempt requires more protection, which seems an acknowledgement that there 
is no one size fits all due process outfit. 324 
So far, so good (even if so far, so vague). Matters gets confusing, how-
ever, when lower courts addressing the issue of bankruptcy judges' criminal 
contempt authority conflate due process constraints, which apply to all 
courts, with Article III constraints on bankruptcy judges. Some suggest that 
while district court judges might be able to award criminal contempt awards, 
bankruptcy judges should be limited to "minor" monetary criminal contempt 
awards in order to comply with the Constitution. One such case, In re John 
tled to a jury trial in any case in which federal law so provides and must be released 
or detained as Rule 46 provides. If the criminal contempt involves disrespect to-
ward or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at the con-
tempt trial or hearing unless the defendant consents. Upon a finding or verdict of 
guilty, the court must impose the punishment. 
(b) Summary Disposition. Notwithstanding any other provision of these rules, the 
court (other than a magistrate judge) may summarily punish a person who commits 
criminal contempt in its presence if the judge saw or heard the contemptuous con-
duct and so certifies; a magistrate judge may summarily punish a person as provided 
in 28 U.S.C. § 636(e). The contempt order must recite the facts, be signed by the 
judge, and be filed with the clerk. 
FED. R. CR!M. P. 42. 
320Under early English common law, "the contempt power extended even to summary execution, and 
there was no avenue for appellate review." Dudley, supra note 292, at 1034; see also Case of Brass Crosby, 
95 Eng. Rep. 1005, 1014 (K.B. 1771) (highlighting Blackstone's observation that "[t]he sole adjudication of 
contempts, and the punishment thereof ... belongs exclusively, and without interfering, to each respective 
Court"). 
321 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(3). 
322Cf Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 844 (1994): 
When an order governs many aspects of a litigant's activities, rather than just a 
discrete act, determining compliance becomes much more difficult. Credibility is-
sues arise, for which the factfinding protections of the criminal law (including jury 
trial) become much more important. And when continuing prohibitions or obliga-
tions are imposed, the order cannot be complied with (and the contempt 'purged') in 
a single act; it continues to govern the party's behavior, on pain of punishment-
not unlike the criminal law. 
323Bingman, 100 F.3d at 657 (9th Cir. 1996). "That one and the same person should be able to make 
the rule, to adjudicate its violation, and to assess its penalty is out of accord with our usual notions of 
fairness and separation of powers." Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 841 (Scalia,]., concurring). 
324See FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(3). 
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Richards Homes Building Co., LLC, explicitly held that "[constitutional] con-
cerns are magnified for bankruptcy courts, which have limited jurisdiction, 
are less capable of providing the necessary procedural protections than dis-
trict courts, and are not Article III courts."325 We do not see the Article III 
concern. 
In sum, we believe that several provisions of the Constitution impose 
material constraints on the exercise of the criminal contempt power, but we 
see no sound basis for the position that Article III, § 2 does. 326 Due process 
is a constraint on all courts and has nothing to do with Article III stature. 
We acknowledge that the Court's contempt jurisprudence is far from unam-
biguous but feel compelled to observe that courts issuing decisions which 
start with the premise that there is a significant nexus between the criminal 
contempt power and Article III both misread the controlling precedents and 
conflate two distinct strands of constitutional jurisprudence. Essentially, 
they mix Article III apples with Due Process oranges.327 
C. OTHER CoNSTITUTIONAL CoNSIDERATIONS 
There are still other arguments sounding in constitutionality that suggest 
a problem with bankruptcy judges exercising criminal contempt power. Al-
though none is persuasive, we touch on them briefly here for sake of 
completeness. 
First, some courts have raised ""[ t ]he one who decides must hear"328 prin-
ciple in holding that bankruptcy judges cannot adjudicate criminal contempt. 
They apparently begin with the assumption that bankruptcy judges cannot 
impose criminal contempt and then go a step further to conclude that bank-
ruptcy judges are also unable to issue an order subject to review by the dis-
trict court (as the ten-day objection rule of former Rule 9020 had 
provided). 329 
l
25552 F. App'x 401, 415 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). 
326lnterestingly, the public rights doctrine has been interpreted as inapplicable in criminal matters, as 
such cases "traditionally have been regarded as requiring judicial resolution." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of 
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 915, 952 n.208 (1988). 
That said, magistrate judges do have jurisdiction to try petty criminal offenses. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(4); 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(b)(2) ("At the defendant's initial appearance ... the magistrate judge must inform the 
defendant of ... the right to trial, judgment, and sentencing before a district judge-unless the charge is a 
petty offense .... "). 
l 27We concede, of course, that there may be indirect restriction. For example, if due process requires 
the right to a jury, then a bankruptcy court is bound by the strictures of§ 157(e). 
l
28Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 481 (1936). 
l
29 [W]e conclude that de novo district court review -and certainly where that re-
view is wholly on the basis of the bankruptcy court trial record-is not a sufficient 
basis on which to predicate a section 401(3) criminal contempt conviction for viola-
tion of a bankruptcy court order, notwithstanding that the district court may pur-
port to itself render the judgment of conviction and impose the sentence. On the 
contrary, such criminal con tempts must be tried before the district court. 
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This principle can trace its lineage to English law when review was often 
conducted upon written record, but this principle has never worked its way 
into the relevant Article III jurisprudence.330 In fact, the closest connection 
we found on this point was a comment in the dissent of United States v. 
Raddatz, the case upholding magistrate judges' ability to hear suppression 
motions in criminal trials subject to district court review and plenary author-
ity to conduct a rehearing de novo.331 Justice Marshall dissented from the 
holding that the district court's oversight and ability to order a new hearing 
sufficed for Article III, protesting thus: 
O]udicial factfinding on the basis of a written record carries 
an intolerably high risk of error. Any experienced lawyer is 
aware that findings of fact frequently rest on impressions of 
demeanor and other factors which do not appear on the face 
of the record .... [And] the notion that, as a matter of basic 
fairness, a person facing the prospect of grievous loss is enti-
tled to relate his version of the facts to the official entrusted 
with judging its accuracy. 332 
We have no quarrel with these general observations of dictum, but they 
beg the question whether the bankruptcy judge can render the decision in the 
first instance. For the reasons belabored above, we see no intrinsic reason 
under Article III jurisprudence why the bankruptcy judge cannot both hear 
and decide, and so the constitutional principle of "the one who decides must 
hear" is fully satisfied by residing the decision-making authority with the 
bankruptcy judge. m 
Second, some courts have raised concern over the democratic deficit, 
pointing to the segregation of the contempt power from general legislative 
control over the promulgation of substantive crimes.334 And the unchecked 
Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1513 (impugning former Rule 9020). 
330See, e.g., Local Gov't Bd. v. Arlidge [1915) A.C. 120 (reversing King v. Local Gov't Bd. (1914) 1 
K.B. 160). 
331447 U.S. 667, 679-81 (1980). Chief Justice Burger stated in the Court's opinion: 
In passing the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act, Congress was 
alert to Art. III values concerning the vesting of decisionmaking power in magis-
trates. Accordingly, Congress made clear that the district court has plenary discre-
tion whether to authorize a magistrate to hold an evidentiary hearing and that the 
magistrate acts subsidiary to and only in aid of the district court. Thereafter, the 
entire process takes place under the district court's total control and jurisdiction. 
Id. at 681 (internal citations omitted). This drew a dissent from Justice Marshall. Id. at 696 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
332/d. Justice Marshall did not claim that a district judge must preside over all litigation stages, rather 
his objection was to magistrates presiding over "cases involving case-dispositive issues that are impossible 
to resolve on the basis of the written record." I d. at 698. 
333 See supra text accompanying notes 328-32. 
334See, e.g., Hipp, 895 F.2d at 1513. 
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nature of the contempt power has caused anxiety at the Supreme Court, 
tracing back to In re Terry. 335 The Ninth Circuit has expressed even greater 
concern over this notion of a democratic deficit undergirding contempt, ex-
plicitly worrying about Congress' lack of involvement, even with regard to 
civil contempt. In In re Dyer, an appeal of a bankruptcy court's punitive 
sanction against a creditor who violated the automatic stay, the court fretted 
that the ability of bankruptcy judges to impose contempt sanctions beyond 
the confines of§ 362(h)'s provision for intentional stay violations raised con-
stitutional concerns analogous to common law crimes: 
When a court merely implements the will of Congress-
such as by awarding punitive damages to litigants under 
§ 362(h)-there is no concern that a court is abusing judicial 
power shielded from direct democratic control. In contrast, 
the contempt power is 'uniquely liable to abuse,' in part be-
cause '[ u ]nlike most areas of the law, where a legislature de-
fines both the sanctionable conduct and the penalty to be 
imposed, civil contempt proceedings leave the offended judge 
solely responsible for identifying, prosecuting, adjudicating, 
and sanctioning the contumacious conduct.'336 
The court further noted that "[a]dditional procedural protections are 
therefore required before that authority can be used in a punitive fashion." 337 
The court's negative disposition toward bankruptcy court authority strikes 
us as odd. Article III concern is generally rooted in the notion that judges 
ought to be independent of Congress; yet here, the court seems to be saying 
litigants need the protection of Congress when courts exercise their con-
tempt powers. It is certainly legitimate to expect bankruptcy courts to exer-
cise wise restraint when imposing contempt citations. However, this 
argument, like so many others, again leaves us wondering what that expecta-
tion-or even requirement-has to do with the fact that bankruptcy judges 
lack the mantle of Article III. On the contrary, if the concern is immunity 
from political pressures and accountability, then that concern should attach 
with equal if not greater vigor to the exercise of contempt authority by a life-
tenured Article III district judge. 
Reflecting on these various constitutional arguments, the trend is clear: 
courts rely on a hodge-podge of constitutional doctrines dressed in Article III 
clothing-that are actually entirely unrelated to Article III jurisprudence-
all in the service of a misguided attempt to prove the constitutional infirmi-
ties of bankruptcy judge contempt powers. It is our view that the courts 
335 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888). 
336Dyer, 322 F.3d at 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 
" 7Id. at 1195. 
372 AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 91 
making these arguments are simply falling victim to, or amplifying, what we 
see as bankruptcy hysteria. On close examination, their arguments simply do 
not withstand scrutiny. 
V. PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Finally, there are a host of prudential considerations that might counsel 
against bankruptcy courts imposing sanctions for criminal contempt. These 
do not flow from alleged constitutional impediments, but they nonetheless 
warrant comment. 
The first concern is jury trials. Given that criminal contempt proceedings 
may carry a right to a jury,338 and given the statutory consent requirement 
for a jury trial in bankruptcy court,339 it may be that contemnors are unlikely 
to consent to proceeding before a bankruptcy judge. The solution to this is 
simple: don't worry about it. Since it is wholly unclear whether the con-
temnors will consent to a jury trial, there is no reason for bankruptcy judges 
to shy away from criminal contempt on the pre-emptive empirical fear that 
the litigants may trend toward non-consent.340 
The second concern is that bankruptcy judges are not familiar with crimi-
nal law, criminal proceedings, or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
This strikes us as a more real problem, because bankruptcy judges are not 
familiar with prosecutors, plea allocutions, and the like. Then again, jury tri-
als are themselves rare beasts in bankruptcy courts already, so it is not clear 
that the "marginal unfamiliarity" of the criminal process is any worse than 
allowing bankruptcy courts to preside over civil juries.341 Still, one would 
want a judge capable and comfortable with the criminal process to preside 
''
8See Fran~, 395 U.S. at 150 (1969) (holding that sentences for criminal contempt in excess of six 
months trigger the right to a jury trial). 
" 9Recall that bankruptcy courts possess the right to hold jury trials pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(e). 
340Even before § 157(e) was added after Granfinanciera, the Article III courts perceived no problem 
with allowing bankruptcy courts- to conduct jury trials, even without the consent provision that came to 
be added by § 157(e): 
The question whether to allow bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials has not 
been answered for us by Congress. It has been left to us. We should decide it in 
the way most consistent with sensible judicial administration, and without concern 
that Article I judicial officers may appear to be encroaching on the turf-usurping [ J 
prerogatives-of Article III judges. We should answer the question "yes." 
In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1161 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner,]., dissenting). 
'
41See In re Grabill Corp., 976 F.2d 1126, 1126 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992) (order denying rehearing en bane) 
(Coffey,]., concurring) (citation omitted) (noting "only 6 jury trials have resulted from the 241,559 bank-
ruptcy filings in the Northern District of Illinois [between 1985 and 1992] ( 4 were held in district court 
and 2 in bankruptcy court)"; see also Stephen]. Ware, Similarities Between Arbitration and Ban~ruptcy 
Litigation, 11 NEv. L.]. 436 (2011) (noting rarity of civil jury trials in bankruptcy court); David L. Tillem, 
An Overview of Ban~ruptcy Litigation, 2008 WL 5939819, at *7 (2008) ("UJury trials are a rare occur-
rence in the bankruptcy forum ... ."). 
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over a criminal trial. Perhaps a solution would be a sua sponte recommenda-
tion of the bankruptcy court that the reference be withdrawn, or the case re-
assigned to another bankruptcy judge, whenever the court feels uncomforta-
ble adjudicating the matter before it. 34 2 
The third trouble is what to do with the core/non-core distinction and 
relatedly what to do about consent (wholly apart from the jury right con-
cerns). If we conclude that bankruptcy courts can impose criminal contempt, 
and we do not condition the authority to enter those awards on the consent 
of the parties, then an odd bootstrapping potential arises. Recall that bank-
ruptcy courts cannot constitutionally enter final judgments in non-core mat-
ters absent consent of the parties; absent such consent they must restrict 
themselves to reports and recommendations to the district court. 3 4 3 If that is 
so, then should a bankruptcy court be able to enter a final judgment of crimi-
nal contempt if the underlying proceeding in which the conduct occurred is 
non-core? The answer is not intrinsically clear to us. On the one hand, it 
could be argued that the greater consent to bankruptcy court final judgment 
over non-core proceedings under § 157(c)(2) subsumes the lesser consent 
over any contempt proceedings appurtenant thereto. On the other hand, es-
pecially when the criminal power of the State is involved, one can say that 
consent to entry of civil judgment should not provide the basis for an implica-
tion of consent to adjudication of criminal proceedings by the same judicial 
officer. Perhaps then we might require express consent to the contempt 
proceeding. 344 
But what if the non-core matter is under§ 157(c)(l), and hence the bank-
ruptcy court is only authoriz.ed to enter a report and recommendation be-
cause the parties have withheld consent? Would giving the bankruptcy 
court the power to enter final judgment in a contempt matter when the par-
ties have exercised their Article III right to adjudication before an Article III 
district judge create an odd bootstrap where the bankruptcy court would 
have more adjudicative authority in contempt-and possibly criminal con-
tempt-than it would have in the underlying proceeding? We confess this 
342Perhaps Judge Posner's dissent in Geras vitiates some of these concerns, see supra note 288, in 
highlighting the rarity of contempt proceedings. In light of contempt's rarity (let alone "serious" contempt 
triggering major due process concerns), Judge Posner wryly observed, "We are told that by a happy 
coincidence [that the power to hold someone in contempt of court] is [a] crucial thing- that by this, and 
this alone, shall a federal judge be recognized. Actually it is about as crucial as the robe." Geras, 742 F.2d 
at 1049 (Posner, J., dissenting). If contempt proceedings constituted a substantial portion of the federal 
docket, or if there was a reason to believe that such proceedings necessitated skillsets that bankruptcy 
judges substantially lacked, then perhaps there would be more of a reason to give pause. Consider, too, 
that some bankruptcy judges are formerly magistrate judges, and "baby judge school," attended by magis· 
trate and bankruptcy judges, can presumably add whatever to its curriculum is desired. 
34328 U.S.C. § 157(c). 
344Cf Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1947·48 (2015) (distinguishing express from implied consent). 
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gets us into deeply uncomfortable territory, especially in light of the touchy 
constitutional terrain bankruptcy judges occupy in the first place. The coun-
tervailing concern is that if the contempt power (at least some degree of it, 
e.g., direct contempt) is intrinsic to the functioning of a court, then it might 
be problematic to declaw a judge of punitive power in his or her 
courtroom. 345 
Finally, it might be helpful to compare the contempt authority accorded 
magistrate judges by statute.346 While, for the reasons discussed above, we 
note that bankruptcy judges likely have more authority as a matter of histori-
cal precedent, at least within their bailiwick of bankruptcy, than magistrate 
judges, it may nonetheless be prudent to consider the restrictions under 
§ 636 as applying to bankruptcy judges. For example, it might make sense for 
bankruptcy judges to follow the pattern of district court judges' contempt 
authority for core matters, but subject themselves, perhaps by Rule, to the 
same restrictions as magistrate judges for non-core matters. The advantage of 
doing so would be to prevent the ocid situation where bankruptcy judges 
have asymmetric power with counterpart judicial officers. Again, this flows 
from neither statutory nor constitutional compulsion, but just as the Emer-
gency Rule eventually found its way into BAFJA, the bankruptcy system 
might function more effectively if these restraints were codified in statute -
a kind of adoption of bankruptcy contempt best practices. 
CONCLUSION 
We have gone on long enough. The Constitution imposes important con-
straints on the exercise of judicial power by judges who lack the full protec-
tions of Article III. The Constitution also imposes important constraints on 
the exercise of the contempt power. These provisions are unrelated and fre-
quently conflated by many courts. Freed of this analytical confusion, we 
have no problem reading § 105 for what it is-an expansive conferral of stat-
utory authority (assuming, arguendo, that such a grant is required in the first 
place) for bankruptcy courts to exercise contempt powers. We recognize 
that there are prudential and pragmatic considerations that flow from our 
conclusion, and we look forward to courts and policymakers working them 
out. We just want them to do so reasonably, without hysteria. 
345 If a party can make himself a judge of the validity of orders which have been issued, 
and by his own act of disobedience set them aside, then are the courts impotent, 
and what the Constitution now fittingly calls 'the judicial power of the United 
States' would be a mere mockery. 
Campers, 221 U.S. at 450. Magistrate Judges may impose summary direct contempt. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(e)(2). They may enter prosecution-on-notice contempt with party consent in other situations. Id. 
at § 636(e)(3). One might explore in subsequent work whether they feel defanged under this approach. 
346See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e). 
